APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: MAY 2007 sont DIRECTORATE .OF - INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Report | Peking’s Support of eee | In Southeast Asia’ (Reference Title POLO LIM) ‘EO 12958- 3.3(b) (1) 3: EO 12958 3.3(b) (6) 3: EO 12958 6.2(c) April 1973 RSS- No. 0065/73 WARNING Ma nd the Phidinaines Chinese officials (including Chou) have refused in.each case to give . a promise . to end support of insurgencies. In these private talks, no Chinese official has offered a .. "reasonable" deal -- that is, cessation of: support in return for breaking ties with Taipei. And no other trade-off has been offered.’ By contrast, explicit and concrete guarantees to end insurgency-. support have. been given. with alacrity to envoys from Ethiopia and Zaire, thé. payoff having been formal diplomatic recognition of the PRC, -iii- z y. intormation proves con-. clusively that in two cases (Burma and. Thailand) Peking has sent in men to keep the insurgencies moving.-- This manpower has. included PLA officers (as high in. rank as the equivalent of "general"), PLA non- commissioned soldiers, PRC ethnic: minority citizens recruited in China, and insurgent.leaders trained in China.. The Chinese themselves for the first time admitted (in March 1973)-that sustained Chinese aid would include "manpower" inputs into Burma, Additional support is present .in the form of material aid: this has iftcluded modern weapons and supplies, as well as the.extensive use: of a PLA hospital.near the Burma and Thailand — border. In addition, the insurgents have had special training on the China-side of the border in PLA-run camps. The insurgents in the field receive indoctrina- tion and guidance regularly from three China-based and Chinese-run clandestine radio stations, one. each. for Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia, These are opera-. tional radios -- that is, shortwave transmitters broadcasting to professional insurgents. In this way, the Chinese disséminate their ideas --- including . virtual directives --:on how to strengthen and expand the insurgent territory. The broadcasts. contain: timely materials (well- ~reséarched in China) on develop-- ments within each target country, inspirational propaganda, and guidelines for activities. The Chinese leaders have refused explicit requests: from Rangoon, Bangkok, and: Kuala Lumpur to cease this operational broadcasting, and on-1*March.1973 their clandestine radio for Thailand declared that it would not cease its "mobilization and morale-boosting" work. This policy indicates that when faced with the concrete, specific choice.of either priority to diplomacy or priority to insurgency-support, the Chinese leaders thus far are. continuing to give priority to the latter in dealing with these coun- In-Burma, some. PLA officers are ensconced in the Northeast. Command -- the insurgents' opera- tional headquarters. These officers are. the de: ‘facto commanders of the insurgent forces, and the . decision to initiate any big attack, such as a sustained assault on a. town, apparently is made by these: Chinese officers, in coordination with in- surgent.leaders. The PLA men almost: certainly are: — responsive to directives from the nearby Kunming — Military Region --- active in insurgent aid -- and ultimately to Peking. The theory that the Kunming MR commander is acting indeperidently of, and against the: policy of, Peking is not. credible. There prob-- ably now is. a separate, all-Chinese PLA. military unit. operating. in a field command role within: Burma's: northeast. Mixed platoons form part of the bulk of the 4,000 to 5,000 insurgent forces, In Thailand, at least one. former PLA officer of "general" rank (or the equivalent} is acting as an. advisor to an reent Gader in north Thailand, He was infiltrated with a group of about 200 former PLA officers and men, . © specially trained and selected for duty with the insurgents, Several officers of the infiltrated ‘unit may also have a.command. role, as they report- edly include the political officer of a PLA regiment, a field grade officer of a PLA regiment, anda deputy. commander of a PLA company. These 200 profassional soldiers arrived in-north Thailand bases in November 1971, and it-is likely that more specially-trained PLA personnel will be sent into improve the military integrity of the insurgents in the north (about 2,900 men) and the northeast (about 2,000 men). , “VO ‘In’ Malaysia, Peking's support of the 1, 800- insurgents ‘does not include direct sinputs of personnel go ee or weapons, for obvious logistical reasons, This : handicap is also operative in Peking's support of the 1,000 Maoist insurgents in the Philippines. The Communist leadership of both these insurgencies is loyal to Peking on an entire range of.issues and is pledged to fight a long, Mao-model. war against the government. The Chinese-run operational radio,... Voice of the Malayan Revolution, broadcasts regularly from §outh. China to insurgents. in. Malaysia, calling for an ‘expansion of their armed struggle. There. is no sign that these broadcasts will be discontinued . in the near future. yeas cis veaaere Sate os mines important obstacle to establishing diplomatic. rela- tions with Peking is this insurgency-support. Peking's ° policy strengthens the argument against establishing relations by those men within the respective country leaderships who desire a go-slow approach; it weakens ‘the argument of those who advocate early recognition.. Undoubtedly, Chou En-lai is fully informed of this. impediment to new diplomatic. UGCERO ES and sees the irrationality of it. The main reason for the. continuation of Peking's self-defeating policy to support insurgencies nearby seems clearly to be Mao's ideological and personal ~ desire to prove that Mao-model. armed struggles can be: born and survive. On a deeper, perhaps: even unconscious, level he may want to prove this to himself -- as well as to. .the scoffing Soviets, who have disputed this point with him for over a decade. Mao still insists that armed struggle is the onl road. to national power for Communists. This dogma in Mao's thinking apparently is. not as firmly rooted -Vi- in Chau's thinking. As with Stalin, it will prob- ‘ably prove to be the case that after the dominant: leader is.dead certain of the old leader's obsessions -- including, in the Chinese case, support:of in-. | ‘surgencies -- will be exposed for what: they. are,. irrational concepts impeding policy, and will then “.be marked for discard, ; PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST: . Contents: IDEOLOGY : THE UNSHAKEN FOUNDATION... The Source of. Insurgency Revival. The Incongruous Mix in Southeast Agha: ‘. Radio Peking and the..Clandestine Radios’ The Retreat from uaeoveeivet Rigidity Elsewhere... .-. Africa and the Middie™ East a Latin America. . .: Struggle". . . Support. eo e #67 @ © © wie © 8 «© BuLMa- eo. 6: eae ee ee ew Thailand. sont. 6 aoe Br Heo BH PEKING'S INSPIRATIONAL ROLE., . . The. Philippines’. . 6... ete: Malaysia ws aN Sait West... cas ie eo @' ee 6 eo ele East: North Borneo. ....-: o As The Durability of Ideology: "armed : The Durability of Chinese Insurgency- PEKING'S PRIMARY ROLE IN: THE INSURGENCIES | ASTA- PEKING'S SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES: IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IDEOLOGY: THE UNSHAKEN FOUNDATION Since Mao Tse- tung! s Cultural Revolution. in 1967, and earlier in the case of Thailand, Peking has been. playing a major role in Stimulating .the revival of floundering insurgencies in seyeral Southeast Asian countries. The armed insurgencies in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines virtually had’ collapsed in the 1950's and in effect, had been abandoned by . Peking for purposes of diplomacy. This .policy of. dis- engagement was reversed in the case.of Thailand in. 1965, and in the cases of Burma, Malaysia, ‘and the- Philippines.in 1967. The new policy of political stimulation and various kinds of material support: . stems basically from the ideological and personal in- clinations: of Mao which had been touched off by a punish- ment motive but whaeh are not now sustained by that, motive, - The Source of Insurgency Revival . “The thrust -- that is, the initial propulsion. “- for revival of the insurgencies came from Peking rather © than from the guerrillas who were hiding in the jungles. In the earliest case, Thailand, the Chinese overall. promoting role was suggested by the remark of Eoreign ° Minister Chen Yi on 8 January 196 g . on in Thailand before the year is out," Shortly there- - after, Mao himself, speaking of the war in Vietnam and other guerrilla wars, insisted that the major Communist. . . ’ %. a 3 ‘ Insurgent training camp in People's Republic of China and Country of deatination ny Radio Station, @® Area of commun|st insurgency REPUBLIC OF CHINA eSuel-yang Chang-sha THIS PAGE _ INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK THIS PAGE | INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK powers must play an activating, inciting role.. He . ‘lectured his visitor, Premier Kosygin, on 11.February 1965 on the need to promote the insurgencies:. "We must stimulate." Mao asserted this in a direct. rejec- tion of Kosygin's statement that it should be the sole decision of “each party" whether guerrilla war should “' be started. ; 7 The policy.of deliberate stimulation. included an entire range of methods of practical support. One of the material inputs which required a Chinese leader-: ship decision was the diplomatically sensitive one of : supplying: Chinese-made weapons. Praior to the Cultural Revolution,, it had:been Chinese practice to avoid such a policy of supply, inasmuch as captured Chinese- made weapons would be concrete evidence of PRC inter- ference in revolution beyond its borders. But in 1967, ° Mao apparently decided to’ change this cautious and prudent policy. Speaking to cadres in late June or: - early July 1967 about the "Strategic Arrangements" (or, overall plan) of his Cultural Revolution, Mao discussed his attitude toward guerrilla fighters abroad, We should give them arme and ean now openly give them arms, tneluding — clearly inseritbed Chinese weapons (except in certain areas)... * Evidence later revealed (for the first time in 1969), that the Thai insurgents were being supplied with clearly identified Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles. The insurgents in Burma were also shown to have been receiving easily identifiable Chinese-made weapons, That this was deliberate Chinese policy, rather than ‘a policy the North Vietnamese on their own were _ practicing a caches in Laos, is indicated by the Statement of Politburo member Kang Sheng. Speaking on- 13 February 1968 to Red Guards representatives . from Yunnan Province, Kang said that "Our arms dre also made to help Vietnam to fight the Americans, to aid the. Burmese and Thai people.” In addition to supplying weapons from Yunnan, : the Chinese have used that strategically-located border province as a base for infiltrating PLA personnel and .for providing China-~side training for the insurgencies ‘in Burma and Thailand, The central role of this pro- vince was indicated by another Politburo member, Hsieh Fu-chih, in his speech to the abovementioned Red Guards representatives. Hsieh said that "Yunnan is not only the rear area behind Vietnam but also an important base for revolutionaries in Burma, Thailand, and Laos," The shift from a policy of disengagement .to one. of deliberate stimulation and support was accompanied by Chinese insistence to the insurgents that the guer~ rilla war must be well-organized in order to make posi- tive gains, At an early date, the Chinese began to show their pleasure with the new and serious way thé insurgents were prosecuting the small war. For example,. speaking to an "activist congress" in.Shanghai on. 4 April 1968, Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao said that "In Burma, guerrilla warfare has made faster press ess in. one year than in the past 20 years."' The three clandestine radio stations beaming broadcasts into the nearby insurgencies from China for several years have noted the improvement in organization, commitment, and fighting tactics of the insurgents Peking supports. The contrast with the epee showing of the 1950's is striking. : "The Incongruous Mix in Southeast Asia __ Peking's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia is strikingly marked by a dual approach. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is simultaneously trying to. improve relations with countries in the area while the CCP is supporting insurrections ~- and helping to expand them -- within these countries, Both policies are going forward at the same time. Diplomacy toward Burma, . Thailand, Malaysia. (including North Borneo), and the Philippines is not displacing insurgency~support. In- surgency-support is not displacing diplomacy. By con- trast, policy toward Africa (other than PRC support of insurgencies against colonial or white’ governments) and Latin America reveals a clear-cut displacement of insurgency-support by diplomacy. In the Middle East, PRC support of Arab insurgency against Israel primarily aids national self~interest rather than revolutionary interest. Only in Southeast Asia is the PRC policy equally and inharmoniously mixed. Officials from non-Asian countries, who have held talks with Chinese officials in recent years have reported on the incongruous nature of Peking's dual policy. They see a conflicting, rather.than a har- monious, mix of the two components. This is further evidence that PRC diplomacy must work within revolutionary limits, PRC Foreign’ Ministry officials (and Chou En-lai) have a warrant to “adopt a flexible attitude" to improve government-~to-govern- ment relations "even if a country previously ddopted a- policy hostile to China" (as a joint editorial of 1 October 1972 put it). But they have no warrant, even in private talks, to promise an end to insurgency- Support in Southeast Asia, Chou, and .Foreign Ministry officials working for him, apparently are operating under an overall guide- line of Mao's, This guideline requires that they main- | tain for Southeast Asia a two-level policy, clearly duplistic in the view of leaders in nearby countries, and duplistic in the Chinese leaders! own perception of it. There is. evidence that the two-level policy is a deliberate and planned course of action, rather than a dying remnant of a policy Mao retains reluct-. ‘antly. In capsule form, the policy requires that Chou work for improved relations with Burma, Thailand, ‘Malaysia, ‘and the Philippines but not at the expense .of ceasing support of the insurgencies in these four countries. plemented by Chou had not aided PRC diplomacy. Thai leaders were not driven to change their foreign policy lines, On the contrary, some of them cited Chou's revolutionary statement as cause ‘for going slow -- slower than other Thais desired --. in increasing contacts with Peking. In Burma, Ne Win has been driven to seek rapprochement with. Thailand, . The most recent ‘confirmation that insurgency- support is a deliberate policy, rather than an aberrant -9~ 0 vé p g ou made it clear to Ne Win ther. China welcomes ee state-to-state. relations with Burma, but that the Chinese ‘Communist Party cannot ignore its obligation: to aid, as Mao points: out, "all fraternal parties which are strug- -gling for a just: cause and for their liberation.” Chou's conclusion: the Chinese Communists "will continue" to support the Burmese Communists, ‘Radio Peking and the Clandestine Radios The Chinese seem to recognize that their image with the Western powers and: Japan requires a concealment of the extent of PRC support of insurgency. This “fact is reflected most clearly in Chou's well- documented - actions to differentiate government from party AUPBOE and open from covert support. Radio Peking, which beams broadcasts toa wide: range of international audiences, has reduced its © coverage of nearby insurgency developments. This has taken place, step-by-step, since the fall of 1970 in the case of Burma, and since mid-1971 in the cases of «- Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Recourse to © a Similar low-profile, or disengagement from open sup- port, has been the policy also with the PRC central press. Radio Peking and the central press now only rarely initiate a commentary on the nearby - aneurgenctes.: The practice has become one of pobngaccannens or reprinting either an item from one of. the clandestine radios in south China or from foreign news sources. The three clandestine radios, broadcasting from. complexes in China -- two from Yunnan. and one from Hunan ---continue to beam native language programs regularly to the insurgents in Burma, Thailand, and- Malaysia. Programs detailing aspects of the insurgency in the Philippines. are carried by the radio handling Malaysian guerrilla developments. The broadcasts range in content from guidance and indoctrination programs to highly abusive attacks on the leaders of nearby -: governments in ‘the area. The attacks are more abusive than those Radio Peking. had carried, except for a period - in 1967 at the peak of Mao's Cultural Revolution, Théy ‘area source of concern to leaders of nearby govern~ - ments, and they are one of the concrete Chinese practices which has slowed down the. progress of PRC diplomacy in the area. : gee one Aside from the emphasis in the broadcasts on how - to make the insurgencies work, the radio programs are conceived on the asstimption that the men in the field are under a strong study discipline. On occasion, the assumption seems to be that they are under roughly the same, study discipline as CCP mainland cadres. For example, in May 1972, the text of one of Mao's essays. was broadcast. to insurgent cadres in Malaysia by the: broadcasts of the clandestine Voice of. the Malayan Revolution (VMR). ° On other occasions, the complete text of PRC statements are broadcast, obviously for study and memorization. There is considerable evidence that Chou En-lai | -is the most important official implementing the trans-. parent device of separating state-to-state from party-. to-party relations, Chou's personal activities. began. in the spring of 1971, included the visit of Ne Win in August 1971, and appeared openly as a basic policy in October 1971, ‘when Peking started tohold separate National Day receptions. for foreign diplomats and foreign Communists. . pe ‘The number of greeting messages, connected with various Chinese anniversary dates and.attributed to _ Communist parties engaged in the nearby insurgencies, has been reduced in-Radio Peking and central press coverage. These messages are handled by the clandéstine radios assigned to each. insurgency. Messages of. greet-: ings from one Communist Party to another are also asSigned to the clandestine radios, a recent example ..being the message from the. Burmese Communists to. the Thai Communists on 30 November 1972, commending the Thais for fighting against the “traitorous Thanom-Praphat — clique" and for "following the teaching of great Chair- man Mao Tse-tung that: political power. grows out. of the ' barrel of a gun," The broadcast: stated that the Burmese. Communists are following the same.Mao-model policy. The Retreat from Ideological Rigidity Elsewhere Beyond Southeast Asia, Chinese spokesmen have ~ a less restricted scope which permits them in private talks to promise to cease: supporting uprisings. within other countries. They are able effectively to avoid. risking damage to PRC diplomacy; they need not accept. a slowdown in. its advance by rigidly supporting insur-. rections. or sudden coups, ‘Africa ‘and the Middle, East A clear indication that the Chinese are aware of the incongruity of revolution and diplomacy is _ found in the way they have downgraded insurgency-support (except in cases of colonial-or white regimes) when: -12s 1 they desire a rapid advance of government-to-government relatigns. In order to let diplomacy take command, they have begun to say that China cannot support in- . surrection in Africa because there’ isS'no potential there for it. Politburo member Kang Sheng told visiting Latin American Communist Party leaders in the summer of 1970 that there were "no revolutionary possibilities" emerg- ing in Africd and Latin America." Kang went on to say that, with countries there, China's relations were on a "government-to-government" level, This has become the established line for the PRC’ Foreign Ministry. : The shift of the Chinese from support of revo- lution is most striking in the case of Africa. In the. captured Tibetan documents of 1961, the. enunciated policy was that Africa provided the best prospect (better, even, than Southeast Asia). for revolutionary situations. The policy was that revolution there should be stimulated and that the whole continent could be. rolled up like a map. In compliance with this kind of ideological. hubris, Chou En-lai himself declared in Somalia in February 1964 that "Africa is ripe for revolution," This was a diplomatic blunder, uncharacteristic of Chou, which immediately and subsequently impeded the progress of PRC diplomacy and temporarily aided that of Taipei on the continent. In more recent years, given the warrant to be diplomatically prudent, Chou and Chinese Foreign Ministry officials have adopted an attitude of disengagement from revolution, More im- portantly, they have been permitted to be precise and explicit in stating. this attitude. ; particularly in all military and political improvement activity, The loyalties of even the local militia unit members -~ presumably people who have not qualified for CPT membership -- are clearly to the Chinese Communi . CPT leaders in Thailand's cities also also directly apply Mao's ideas to ‘concrete policies, ae a7 55 none Deene fiateeiale ack as the July 871 roth anni- versary of the CCP editorial and "radio broadcasts") were being used as guiding and line-setting instruments. "Town committee” members organized visual study tours, one such tour being to China regarding matters of a a CPT "branch" located in Bangkok, This was undertaken . Bae by one cadre in 1972, but contact with the mainland by covert couriers is maintained either northward through the jungles, to Laos, and’ on to Yunnan, or southward and eastward through the Bangkok-Hong Kong route. There is some evidence of a Chines e-supported funding apparatus that operates between Chinese agénts in Hong Kong and CPT contacts who travel from Bangkok Ahoy a The CPT leadership is primarily Chinese, with only a few Thais having been promoted to key positions, and these having been trained for many. years’ in China. This ethnic Chinese domination at the top of a Peking- controlled party apparatus helps to sustain that control. It was significant that the delegates representing the CPT at the November 1960 conference of Communist parties in Moscow spoke in Chinese, not. Thai. in 1965, resentment a é inese hold s had caused ambitious but frustrated Thai members to leave party ranks, A clevage developed between the Cf&P-loyal ethnic party leadership and Thai. rank and’ file members. Thai resentment in the CPT regard- ing an overbearing attitude on the part of the Chinese was so strongly felt as to be a definite hindrance to - party operations. Thai members viewed the Chinese as having preempted ali the leadership positions and thus saw little reason to exert themselves. Further, Thai members were convinced that what little advancement they ‘could aspire to would come only through fawning over their Chinese leaders rather than through achievement of merit. Despite CPT recruitment among Thais, entry ~ seemed to be weighted in favor of ethnic Chinese. Thai candidates in 1965 were subjected to more complicated and time consuming procedures than were .tthe Chinese. | Thai trainees experienced: discrimination in China and one returnee complained that the CPT was controlled by the Chinese only for "their" benefit. Subsequently, the Chinese have tried to dssuage Thai feelings, but this kind of alienation probably continues to exist. CPT subordination to the CCP is also apparent | in the obedient and unequivocal support given .to every position the CCP adopts in the Sino-~Soviet dispute, The trast, the independent North Vietnamese -- leaders of | CPT does not display any of the independence associated with a.really unsubordinated party apparatus. By con- - the Lao Dong Party -- adopt a position of neutrality: in the dispute, clearly showing unsubordinated status, CPT greetings to the CCP have none of the self-respect of Lao: Dong Party greetings, but they display instead. a sycophantic quality to the parent party, especially in the sustained tribute to Mao's "thought," indicating apparatus subordination. : The CPT is neither free from Peking’ s control nor subordinated to Hanoi's control at the top leader~ ship level, But at the lower level, the situation has been changing. At least since 1969, and probably some- what earlier, disputes between ‘China~trained and North’. Vietnam-trained lower-level cadres have been reported “consideration g y the o Closing down all training of Thai Communists ‘at North Vietnam's Hoa Binh camp, partly because of the DRV's increasing - involvement in the war in South Vietnam and partly because an ideological dispute was raging between the Mao-oriented CPT and North Vietnamese personnel, _ During the summer of 1969, om-Kra a tre ‘CPT headquarters in Hin Long KIa in Ti- province area of north-central Thailand was embroiled in a dispute over ideology. Those who had been trained earlier in Hoa Binh (DRV) could - not accept the official C ine adhering: to Maois- ~62- "thought" as the correct ideological policy for protracted warfare. CPT leaders at the camp accused the North Vietnamese-of being "weak Communists, death-fearing, and pleasure-seeking," The Lao Dong Party was said to be “semi-revisionist."’ The CPT at the camp prohibited . '- the singing of North.Vietnamese: songs and held daily ceremonies wishing long life to Mao and Lin Piao. specia group was to eking . id not fully trust the DRV army. That army,-as Peking saw it, while opposed to western "imperialism," was never against the “imperialism of the Soviet Union." CPT political officers told-the special PLA group that Peking had a closer relationship with the CPT because the CPT was following the example of China and had. adopted Mao's Marxist-Leninist ideals. 1969 suggests that Han “in lower - cadre ranks. It also suggests that the CPT has been instructed by the CCP to have its cadres combat any further spread of this North Vietnamese penetration.: Top leaders of the CPT had been trained in China in the 1950's at a time when the Vietnamese Communists had no training role. Only in the mid-1960's, and. afterward, were the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao allowed to help in the training of cadres. They took on-a-considerable share of the task of training, equip- ping, and reinfiltrating insurgent cadres. North ‘Vietnam's insurgent training school at Hoa Binh has been training Thai insurgents Since about 1962. Training also takes place at special bases in Laos. These men filled out the middle and lower-level leadership ranks, The more intensive and sophisticated training required of top leadership cadres is given in China. | ——| g an trainees in North — tham who Were sent on for "Nadditional" study in China had to have six months of training in North Vietnan, to be members of the CPT, and otherwise qualified. Only two or three persons were chosen from each trainee- group trained in North Vietnam for further training in China, The training curriculum in China was far more difficult than in North Vietnan. , The evidence [~~ ]seens to be that the CPT leadership h Yained in and is loyal. to China. The middle and lower-level cadres have been given North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao training, and some of these men probably are loyal to Hanoi. There are mainland Chinese and North Vietnamese in Thailand | (The mainland inese pres€ncé Wi @ discussed later in this paper.) Some of the. North Vietnamese were: group leaders and instructors. Others were with local insurgent military units. their activities in- cluded i insurgents in the use of the Soviet RPG anti-tank grenade launcher, the 60mm mortar, the M-79 grenade launcher, and field radios. Prior to’ 1967, the insurgency in the northeast was not well-organized and there was nothing of signi-- ficance under CPT.control stirring in the. tribal areas of the north. The Chinese, in several steps strung out over the years, and with North Vietnamese help, moved in the:direction of sponsoring a viable guerrilla.war, making it more professional and efficient than anything previously in Thailand, In mid- 1962, the Chinese coreutiened a key. ; guidance and indoctrination instrument: the VPT radio ‘station near Kunming, Yunnan. VPT broadcasts en- couraged the insurgents to begin a Mao-model "armed struggle" against local government forces. Only a , small number of insurgents were active at -that time in the northeast; others were still being trained in Yunnan and in the Hoa Binh training center, North Vietnam, Peking introduced a sense of urgency into this low-boil insurgency only when larger strategic con- siderations confronted the Chinese and North Vietnamese leaders. The major consideration was the establishment ” of more U.S. air bases in-Thailand to be used.in support of the allied effort in Laos. (Souvanna Phouma first requested U.S. reconnaissance.in May 1964, and a month later these planes were authorized to return fire. . Thai pilots participated by mid-1964, manning some. T-28 bombers. All this was from bases in Thailand. } Peking! s attention turned to aeseene to warn the That leaders. -_ 7 against cooperation with the U.S. against Communist forces in Laos, and then to punish the Thai leaders for not responding properly to the warning. Thus the marked increase in Peking's attention to the Thai insurgency had its beginning in a punishment motive, But, as will -be shown, at the same time a revolutionary motive was present in Mao's policy thinking on. Supporting such in- - surgencies. : The Chinese acted to revive the small insurgency by. directing CPT cadres in the field to expand their | recruitment among non-Communist dissidents. An addi-'- tional course of action was Chinese use of various anti- Bangkok Thai leaders in several "front". groups to serve as a rallying point for dissidents anywhere in Thailand, The "front" groups were organized in Peking. In November 1965, Radio Peking and the VPT simul~ ae taneously announced the formation of the opefily anti- Bangkok Thai Independence Movement (TIM). On 1 January 1966, the Thai Patriotic Front (TPF) was placed along- | side the TIM to serve as a poSsible rallying organization for anti~Bangkok dissidents. The idea was to bring together Thai elements who would agree to openly criticize the government and cooperate with Peking in building an out-of-country political entity. These "fronts," however, later proved to be ineffective. They included in their ranks Thai exiles who began to quarrel among - , themselves, and in 1969 they were marked for discard when the: Chinese decided to stress the direct leadership role of the CPT of the insurgency, Unlike the "fronts," the . CPT was a disciplined and obedient instrument of Peking's policy. The course taken to expand the insurgency -can be traced back to September 1964, although low-boil training of guerrilla fighters had taken place in '. decision was made in Peking. previous years. In September 1964, reports indicated that a new and strong emphasis was being given to the Thai language in the new Peking Foreign Languages . Institute, almost certainly to quickly train competent Chinese officials who were to organize Thai cadres on a large scale. On 8 December 1964, Radio Peking for the first time called for the! "overthrow". ef ‘the Bangkok government, On 8 January 1965, the. Chinese overali inspirational and guiding role was suggested by the remark of Foreign Minister. Chen Yi [jin Peking. Chen Yi declared avs We may have a guerrilla war going on in Thatland before the year.te out, The implication was that there had not been a serious and well-organized insurgency effort in Thailand prior to 1965, and that it was now Peking's intention to make it serious. This was not a CPT decision, independently made in the field. CPT leadership cadres, whether in Peking, Hanoi, or Thailand (or Laos’ staging-areas) do not have such strategic decision-making authority. “The Mao himself, within one month, privately in- ‘ dicated the nature of the decisions being made in Peking not only regarding the Vietnam war but also other guer-. rilla wars. He lectured his visitor, Premier Kosygin, in February 1965 in Peking, on what the role of big Communist powers must be to promote insurgencies. Mao ‘ a doctrinal point; ence in the nature of Mao's remarks to Kosygin and Chen Yi's remarks[__-——Ss——SS—_~i (one, month “eartier). Mao: clearly was talking about a doctrinal point -- namely, - stimulating revolution rather than avoiding revolution. He was not talking about the practical (or rational) policy of punishing an anti-China country. . His remarks. reflected the revolutionary obsession he has about making i | 1 insisted that, "We must stimulate.'"* There was a differ- - Fa . guerrilla wars the road to power for certain pro-Peking . Marxists-Leninists; this. had been a major issue between” him and the Soviet leaders, Chen Yi had not been making | é was indicat- : p : Way OF punishing kok, The remarks. yo ee of: Mao aad Chen polit up the two fundamental. motives te then operative in Peking's policy of insurgency promo- tion. One is doctrinal, ideological, and newouuctonary: The other is practical. ; : 4 The year 1965 included not only: a eopaieter Chi- nese decision to beef up the Thailand insurgency but also implementation of that decision in the form of. training and strategic ook eee : "It waa tn the course of an argument with Kosygin on the matter of promoting guerrtiila wares that Mao used this capeule formulation. Disputing privately . on 11 February 1965, Mao had said that: "We are against world war but we are for revolutionary war... © A situation of revoluttonary war must be created." : Kosygtn tmmedtately had replied that "Each country may must determine. that. Each. party." Mao's immediate ; . reply was to instest on an outside, big-power, acttvat- ing vole: "We must stimulate.” -68: yétted to 1972 or 1975 Secure area in the northeast £ Chinese projection, as seen to fessional, cautious, and reali end of 1966, the insurgents had infl ratepists a at the Consolidation o or the insurgents, fa This day, appears ‘to be pro- Stic. casualties on Thai -government personnel, But the guerrillas were handed a major defeat in 1967, In February and August, Thai security forces captured key Communist guerrillas in the northeast, virtually destroying the insurgency there for several years. The Chinese shifted their attention in 1967 from the ruins of the guerrilla effort in the northeast to the north, In the north, the Chinese saw greater as- sets and potential. The insurgents were mostly tribal (Meo), and they were better fighters. The rugged mountains provided safer sanctuary; and supply lines from China through Laos were Shonen: The CPT was to recruit among then. ; "Meo people in the north had been trained, on a small scale, in North Vietnam and China prior to 1967. But in that year, the effort may have been. stepped up. € a very Strong émphasis on the need for insurgents to be totally indoctrinated and organizationally well-. disciplined. The idea of insurgents "gradually raising their political consciousness and sense of organization” in order to make a revolution succeed (Peking People's Dest , Red Flag, Liberation Army Daily joint editorial October 1972) is eoneidered y the Chinese one of the clear differences between Mao's road and Guevara's "purely military" road, The imposition of this idea on the practical activities of the CPT recruiters and ~70= eh Ae SI organizers in the north and northeast has helped give the insurgencies there the firm foundation of discipline needed to make a revolution advance. Political commit- . ment undoubtedly was stresséd in the course of training of Meo and Yao tribesmen who were reported in June 1968 in the insurgent school at Tali,-Yunnan. The shift to the Meo insurgents in the north | was also reflected in Peking's indoctrination and guidance instruments. Starting in the summer of 1968, ‘Radio Peking and the VPT began carrying Meo~-language | broadcasts to the tribal fighters. The content was inflammatory and clearly intended to turn the Meos decisively against the government. (Fighting between the Meos and government forces had already broken out in the north in early 1968; more seriously, an insurgent unit .=khad attacked the town of Chon Daen in the tri- province area farther south in November 1968.) In September 1968, greatly intensified broadcasting from China became a‘'regular feature of Chinese support and guidance. -The theme was oppression of the Meo people. The theme has been carried through to the present time. An example of Peking's indoctrination and stimulation effort follows: The US-Thanom elique has conetantly tooked down upon the Meo people.... The Meo tribesmen have earned their living for generations without the ° help of an oppressive administration... the CPI ts leading the people to rise and stage a vevolution...the Meo people have no alternative...than to take arms and fight against it... (Yunnan-based VPT broadcast of 30 August 1969) (Emphasts supplied) Cae These broadcasts are also beamed ih to help the insur- gents in their recruitment effort. For example, the - contents of a leaflet mailed to a "village volunteer" member in south Thailand on 26 June 1972 used themes which appear in VPT broadcasts: the goal of the in- surgency is to "overthrow" the government, theré is only one party -- the CPT -~- and there is "no foreigner in- . the CPT," the small war is expanding and the government cannot "suppress us," every day the people "give ‘more _ support to the TPLAF," and "you should turn the barrel of your gun on'the US-Thanom-Praphat regime which is the enemy of the people," ' _ i : the natur a al support fia ar n 1969 in the north, At that time, newer weapons -- particularly AK-47 rifles -- and medical supplies and uniforms began to come. in, The weapons were Chinese-made rather than only the older American and French carbines, Ail mili- tary equipment in the north apparently originated, and now originates, in China. Stockpiles in north Thailand were filled by inputs from Yunnan directly, or from ‘North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao caches of Chinese-made ‘arms in northwest Laos, The newer and better Chinese- made equipment supplied to the insurgents in the north was not evident among the bypassed guerrillas in the northeast for a year, But in February 1970, insurgents were infiltrating from Yunnan training camp east carrying good equipment, in- cluding the Chinese-made AK-47 assault rifles. In parallel with their stress on political com- mitment, the Chinese placed heavy emphasis on strength-_ ening military organization in insurgent ranks. A regular army command was established as the "Supreme Command.'' Significantly, this information was for the first time revealed by Radio Peking in a broadcast of 1 January 1969. The insurgent forces in.north and northeast Thailand were renamed the "Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces" (TPLAF), organized to fight under the "Supreme Command." On.3 January Radio . Peking took the unprecedented step of having a Chinese official's promise made public to provide "more powerful support a revolutionary people of Thailand." Thereafter in 1969, the Chinese began to: gébex: openly to another organizational improvement -- namely, S to the CPT's leadership role of the insurgency. . Refer- ences to the useless political "fronts" (the TIM and ‘ TPF) were dropped from Peking media statements. At least one of the "front" leaders, who concurrently had been a CPT leader (and therefore a more disciplined . . cadre) was later infiltrated into the Laos-based head- quarters of the insurgency for north Thailand. to serve in the more practical capacity as a conduit for Peking! is instructions, as well asa tactical headquarters com- mander. Recruitment and organizational efforts were thereafter partly directed toward winning the support — of the Meo people for the TPLAF. In March .1970, a tN three-man CPT armed propaganda team, led by” a party member who had had five years of training in China, ‘-lectured villagers in the Doi Luang hill area, Chiang Rai Province of north Thailand. In the course of his propaganda and recruitment sessions, the leader strongly criticized Bangkok policies of "oppression" of the hill people and asked them for more: cooperation with the “army” -- meaning, with the TPLAF. Operations of the - TPLAF had become a point of new emphasis in Chinese | se : public media, beginning in 1969. Eye There is Seeeiar = p\oocumen eaten indicating a stepped-up effort, from onwards, to send more CPT cadres into the northeast -- the area neglected for two previous years, Their task has been reported to be to tighten up cadre discipline in the © northeast, to expand the CPT political base among the populace, "and to strengthen the growing TPLAF ranks. | Regarding the TPLAF, by the spring of 1971, or ' somewhat earlier, the Chinése apparently made a’ deci- sion to make it a viable military force, The decision’ seems to have been to take two measures to build it up. ‘One measure was to greatly expand a reservoir force, the village militia. As early as 1969, enlarging the militia units in villages was stressed by organi- ‘zers in the northeast in order to strengthen the CPT's village-level apparatus, politically and militarily. (In March 1971, a similar decision on militia-building had been transmitted to insurgents under, Chinese con- trol in northeast Burma.) The militia were used not only for political control, but also to flesh out the- ranks of the TPLAF. le eereeeneaS |), July 1971 the CPT. was Upgrading @ capability 0 e village militia in at least one.northeast district so that it could be reorganized into regular companies for inclusion in the ares . The second measure carried out by the Chinese to improve the TPLAF was to send in, covertly, speci- ally-trained PLA soldiers from Yunnan. 274- y were going to a z fighters in Thailand and were to remain there, permanently, They were warned:on pain of death © not to reveal to anyone they were from China. That : is, the PLA input was to be deeply covert and was to try. to avoid discrediting nes diplomatic posture of non- interference. ‘Doi Pha Chi is the CPT headquarters for "Area . 12." It is a base camp, Ie TSer Very. secure, located in. oes a ee cmmanmmammmammstitontaenal Pong District, Nan Province, north Thailand. The mission of the PLA infiltrators was.said [ [te be military training of insurgents, . €ir mission in Thailand was, first, to encourage™. the: ‘Thai community to fight for eventual "liberation, n second, to serve the Thai people, and- third, to jearn: from the Thai Communists what it meant to endure. hard- ships in the fight for an ideal. ; Some of the PLA infiltrators later went into. combat with the insurgent.units to which they were ; assigned; After arrival in Thailand, the PLA person- nel were broken down and sent to existing TPLAF. squads . operating under the area command, headquarters at Doi Pha Chi. personnel among insurgent ranks have also been “in © combat, suggesting that the Chinese Communist policy is. to have PLA infiltrators. improve the fighting cap- ability of the. guerrillas, and to do so.as combat- allies in the field.) In addition to training, a probable military- command role. was included in their mission. There are clear-cut parallels between Peking's covert input of personnel into the Burma insurgency and its input in Thailand. most of a 30-man PLA group ts in one sector of northern Thailand -- presumably part: o£ some 200, infiltrators -- were members of ethnic . minority tribes from Yunnan, although ‘several were Han Chinese, (In Burma, ° those PLA men sent across the- border were primarily ethnic minority peoples.) More-.- - over, PLA soldier-groups were broken down and. assigned. to existing TPLAF squads -- five PLA infiltrators toa TPLAF line squad of from six to nine men, (In Burma, PLA men were integrated into these lower -- as well as a at -- ranks of the insurgent combat units.) Beyond that, PLA-réinforced squads, in at least one case, engaged in a firefight with Thai government forces, © (In Burma, PLA~buttressed units ‘engaged Burmese govern- ment forces in a number of firefights and. on a bigger scale,) Finally, most. medical equipment was from China ‘and casualties who required long recovery were sent back to China, (In Burma, medical supplies were primarily from China, and badly wounded insurgents and PLA person- nel were sent back to the PLA special hospital at Chefang, — Yunnan.) That is, those Chinese actions which had begun in Burma. in 1968 were carriéd-out in Thailand beginning in the spring of 1971, =77- Beyond the military input of this 200-man group, the Chinese have engaged in, and probably still are engaged in, indoctrinating people. by sending them to a PLA-run "cultural school" in Laos.near the China bor- der, Children of villagers in Thailand were dispatched in two groups, one in October 1971 and another in May 1972, to the school, travelling on the Laos side north- ward. by truck (presumably along the PLA-built road in northwest Laos toward the Yunnan border). § per étween seven and 16 months, with work on basic steps in reading and writing. A few students were to be . selected to go on to:‘China for "additional schooling." Each child was told before he left for the school that he was expected to join the CPT; That is, the Chinese are gradually expanding the ranks of their client party, the CPT, at a PLA school which ensures a ee to Peking (rather than to Hanoi). 278+ Beginning in early 1971, Chinese broadcasts re- flected an apparently optimistic appraisal of the in- surgency gains in the north and northeast, By late summer, the claims were that “relatively consolidated revolutionary base areas have been set up in certain. regions. in north Thailand." (NCNA article of 6 August .-° 1971) The Doi Pha Chi camp was a consolidated base ‘area. Privately, this. optimism was: reflected in a - statement made.by a Chinese official. regarding the durability, and organizational integrity of the insurg- | ency. In mid-November 1971, the head of the PRC Foreign Ministry Africa and Asia Department stated privately that Peking objects to terrorist-type movements but is always willing to support colonial wars of libera- tion, as in Mozambique, or ; . - ‘genuine, well-organized people's Liberation movements, as in Thailand. -79- [J tt is. probabie that, the expansion oO @ insurgent forces in the north and the- northeast is being monitored and directed, ultimately, by PLA authorities in the adjacent Kunming Military Region. It is also probable that the PLA officers and men who had been infiltrated in-1971 are in courier and radio contact with these authorities in China while serving as "advisors" to the Thai Communist insurgents. In the immediate future, it is highly unlikely — that Peking will stop sponsoring the insurgency, If it were merely a matter of.improving its international’ - image for diplomatic reasons such support might cease. However, not only the clandestine VPT radio station but NCNA, in its own name, has denounced the "Thanon- Praphat clique," praised the outlawed CPT, and en- couraged the. TPLAF to fight.on and grow in strength “under extremely difficult conditions." (NCNA com- mentary on the 8th anniversary of the insurgency, broadcast from Peking on 7 August 1972) Thus despite Chou En-lai's friendly welcome to the leader. ("advisor") of the Thai table tennis: delegation on 5 September. 1972, government-to-government ‘relations will be kept distinct from PRC support. This was made clear first by Vice Foreign Minister '. Han Nien-lung and then by Chou himself in their early September comments to Thai delegation “advisor Prasit during his Peking visit. Han told Prasit that China ‘could not export revolution, noting that if a people were not willing to rise.up against the established authority, no outside force could create difficulties. -80- Han continued: if, on the other hand, the population supported a revolutionary movement, no one in the world could stop it. Later, when Prasit asked Chou. to reduce the level of support. to the insurgents as a gesture of friendship, Chou replied that China had no intention of involving itself in the internal. activities of any country, but would "assist" libera-. tion movements "anywhere." On the same day that Chou was refusing to end Peking's support, the China- based VPT broadcast a tirade against "the traitorous - Thanom-Praphat clique” regarding an internal: Thailand *. matter. (VPT broadcast in Thai to Thailand of 5 September 1972) While Mao lives, Peking probably will persist in sponsoring the CPT in the insurgency. At the same time, it will continue with its diplomacy, raising it to a higher level of official contact with Bangkok, — This dual policy will require a clear-cut separation of insurgency-support from diplomacy, and Peking in October 1972 did just that by avoiding any mention of: National Day. greetings from the CPT, Nevertheless, the VPT still beams its broadcasts into Thailand from China to buoy up insurgent morale, to set. propaganda themes for them, and to incite anti-Bangkok animosity in order to help them recruit followers. The Thais have asked that the Chinese stop the VPT's subversive broadcasts. The response of the Chinese leaders has been most recently made clear by a broadcast stating, in effect, that the request will be denied. The broadcast, beamed from China, celebrated the llth anniversary of the VPT, and went on to declare that ; o -81- The That people, under oppression ‘.by the US-Thanom clique, heve as their propaganda weapon and their voice this VPI, They have been working together -tn the mobtlizatton and nenate-beosting of the forces... - No matter what methods, tricks, on how standerous a@ propaganda campatqn te resorts to, the bandtt Us-Phanom is ue will never thwart and destroy the VET. (VPT Broadcast in Thai to Thailand of - 1 March 1973) (emphasis supplied) - This deliberate Chinese rebuke to the Thai leaders: is , another indication that insurgency-support will continue '. despite the ceasefire in Vietnam. The insurgency has shown aeeicar concrete gains in the last two years, More PLA personnel may be sent in to be integrated into insurgent ranks. The number of insurgents in the north and northeast has been increasing each year, In September 1972, estimates put the figures at. about 2,900 armed person- nel in the north and about 2,000 in the northeast, Peking probably will support. * the expansion of these regular force units with even more Chinese-made armament, which may include new items, such as heavy . machine’ guns, to’supplement the weapons now coming into the north and northeast. -82-~ PEKING'S INSPIRATIONAL ROLE The Philippines Peking's support of the new, Maoist anti-govern- ment insurgency in the various Philippiné islands is — primarily in the.form of political guidance: and encourage-. ment. However, there is good evidence of training and some funding of pro-Peking leftists over the years. By far the most important, enduring, and substan- tive input from the Chinese Communists, however, is the mental hold they have over the young Filipino Communist, Jose Ma, Sison (aka Amado Guerro) who has strongly :sup-_ ported Peking on political issues and on the tactics . for carrying out the insurgency. This commitment was | - made between mid-1966 and mid-1967, during his visits to China. Through. Peking's guidance and influence, Sison has split off a young and more violence-oriented faction of Communists from the old Communist Party of the Philip- pines (PKP) and a less corrupted faction of insurgents from the old and degenerated Huk guerrilla movement. — With this nucleus and with strong political support . from Peking, Sison has implanted a new. insurgency in northeastern Luzon (recently taking hold in other areas) which is more disciplined than the old Huk movement. He has directed the expansion of his political and military components: along the lines prescribed by his "god," Mao Tse-tung. Sison stresses gradual. expan- sion of "base areas," "quick-decision" warfare, "mass work," organizational discipline, and party control over the army ("the party controls the gun"). The Chinese seem to be satisfied that the commitment of this new leader to. Mao's policies is 50 strong that he is as good as a CCP official in the field. 2832: «. eqe Philipp | a ie : © .Aroa of Maoist‘com Unist insurger A Magia Commuhlat, traifirig: camp *. oat Bm ee Aus i ines: Areas of Maoist Communist Insurgency] Sty THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY — LEFT BLANK THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK The conversion of. PKP-member Sison from his dedi- cation to urban youth radical activities -- as leader of the ultra-left Patriotic Youth organization in Manila -- to dedication to Maoist rural armed insurgency was the result of a confluence of several events. . First,. he had been feuding with older PKP leaders at the. time when Mao's Cultural. Revolution erupted in China. . Also at that time, the Chinese leaders were casting about for support from radicals in various non-Communist Asian countries where US forces were based and were being used to aid Vietnam war efforts. Finally, Mao's dis- pute with the Soviet leaders on an entire range of issues -- including the demands that foreign Communists condemn the CPSU openly and support Mao's obsession that "only" armed insurgency is the road to power for. Com- munist parties:-- was intensifying. Unlike the leaders of the old PKP, who avoided denouncing the US, remained. neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and rejected rural ‘insurgency, Sison adopted all of Mao's positions. In the fall of 1966, Sison was far more willing than the PKP leadership to "denounce: the presence of US bases in the Philippines and to launch his youth activists into organized demonstrations against this presence, . And he was willing to ‘take on the PKP in an internecine fight to move it into the Chinese camp . against the Soviets. He was strongly encouraged and influenced by the Chinese all along one Ways: The Chinese role in Sison's conversion was spread out over a-period of two years,’1966 and 1967. As in the Thailand case, Peking first began to encourage insurgent forces in Luzon -- the old.Huk units -- when it became apparent to the Chinese leaders that President Marcos' _administration had decided to cooperate.with the US military effort in Vietnam. In February 1966, at the time when the Vietnam aid bill of Marcos was pending in Congress and was the center of a major dispute,’ Radio Peking broadcasts to the Philippines “for the first time changed in nature,’ from avoidance of comment on Philip- pine internal matters to open encouragement of the in- surgents. Broadcasts in Tagalog and Filipino to the islands drastically increased, Some Chinese leaders. may have tried to keep this change from injuring the few contacts made with Philippine political figures on the diplomatic level. For example, Foreign Minister Chen Yi told a visiting senator from the islands in March 1966 that the presence of US bases in the Philip- pines, while deplorable, should not prevent friendly Chinese-Philippine relations. Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders seem to have made‘a decision to establish contacts with Philippine leftists.- Sison was invited to China, reportedly with all expenses paid, and stayed from late May to mid-June 1966 as a-guest of the Chinese ¢ People's Institute of Foreign Affairs -- the organiza- tion which functions as the liaison.instrument for bring- ing leftists into China’ under the cover of purely "cul- tural" visits. Sison is reported to-have made other visits to China in 1966, and in late July 1966 he had meetings with the Chinese delegation to the anti-atom bomb conference held in Japan. The Chinese effort with: him that year seems to have been to encourage him to- organize anti-US, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, and he was instrumental in such activity in October. The Chi- nese apparently had not yet reached the point of ecounee: ing a split in the old PKP, and-in, August 1966, they invited a PKP member, A.V. Hernandez, to Peking, - where he spoke in praise of Mao, condemned "revisionism," and attacked the US on the Vietnam war. The Chinése clearly had begun to think in terms of punishment for. the govern- ment when, in late 1966, Peking began to add "the: Philippines" to Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia as Asian countries where armed struggle was developing. . In 1967, Sison found more favor with Peking, He had become an .officer in two radical organizations set | up in the spring of 1967, and he became active in these in addition to retaining his post as chairman of the © radical youth organization, More importantly, at a -time when Peking was encouraging splits within old- line. parties of the Communist movement, Sison held a position on the Secretariat Staff of the PKP. Sison feuded with PKP leaders from the fall of 1966 to the spring of — 1967 -- that is, after his first visit to Peking and just before his second tour in China. The older PKP leaders insisted on remaining neutral rather than siding ‘with Mao against the Soviet leaders, and because Sison | could not impose his line (and for other reasons), he withdrew his small faction from the PKP in mid-April 1967. This took place at..a private meeting where he demanded that the party's General Secretary F. Lava -- whom he abused with the Maoist epithet, "a part-time revolutionary" -- be replaced. How much encouragement the Chinese gave Sison to split the PKP from -within is not known, but he clearly was ‘aware that. Peking was encouraging splits within other neutral or pro-Soviet parties, In any case, the result of his deliberate internal opposition was’ the formation of a nucleus within the PKP for Peking to support.. Peking took Sison on as the most promising of the young, violence- oriented Communists for the purpose of carrying out Mao's policy of making armed insurgency work, - Following this internal split: and prior to. the formation of a separate party, the Chinese’ hosted Sison for seven’weeks, beginning with his entry into China in May 1967, As in 1966, he held discussions with of- ficials of the liaison organ, the Chinese People's. Institute for Poreign Affairs, who almost certaifly were briefed on the course of the internal PKP: split. He was received by Foreign Minister Chen Yi on 7 June. 285s It was during this Chinese-sponsored visit that he be- came the carrier of Mao's policy for the Rapatpp ene insurgency. : ‘In ee in Peking, Sison made his commitment clear in a strongly Maoist speech. He called’ for expul- sion of the US from. the islands, condemnation by the PKP of the CPSU, affirmation of "unity" ' with the CCP, and acceptance of the "success" of Mao's Cultural Revolu- tion and of the superiority of Mao's doctrines. .Sison declared "armed struggle" to be the PKP policy. He made an inspired defense of Mao's view that the "only" way to attain national power for Communists. is "armed ‘ struggle,"' in the course of which the party must be entirely rebuilt and "rural bases" must be developed. (Reprinted in New Zealand's People’s Voice, 10 May 1967) His early May speech in Peking was Lollowed by. an NCNA announcement on 21 May which reported that, in a letter to the CCP on 1 May, the PKP had Deveney itself to a. policy of "armed PETUSELe u This direct intervention by the Chinese into the factional dispute within the PKP aligned the CCP with Sison's faction; the ccP supported his faction and en- couraged him in his opposition. The Chinese~inspired “PKP" pledge appeared as a formal "PKP" politburo statement, the text of which was broadcast in Tagalog to the Philippines. It declared war on the "revision- ist" faction. Later in May, a Peking-directed: propa- ganda campaign was unléashed, the broadcasts stressing Huk military operations and Claiming that this was "'a new development" toward armed insurgency in the Philip- pines revolution. On 29 May, for the first time, an NCNA article revealed that a Philippine People's Libera- tion Army "led by the PKP'" was actively engaged in. guerrilla warfare on Luzon, On the 30th, a People's Daily commentary spoke of final victory "if, armed with Mao Tse-tung's Thought, they fight.a people's war,. establish revolutionary base areas, and encircle the cities from the countryside.” Chinese influence in the formulations was undeniable. Owing to Mao's adamantly-pursuéd dispute with “Moscow on ideological issues, the touting of the "PKP" at the time as.a party dedicated to the doctrine of ‘armed struggle" was important. As in the cases of Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia, there is a very special motivation for Peking's enduring support of armed in- surgency -- something aside from. the anti-US aspect, That. motivation is Mao's obsession -- or compulsion (Khrushchev .had described it as an "itch") -- to prove to himself and to others that his road to power is the best and "only" road. for revolutionaries. This obsession is irrational, as there are examples of revolutionaries taking power by palace coups and by legal election processes, But it exists as a funda- mental motivating force, imbuing an otherwise strongly = pragmatic foreign policy with an encumbering dogma, As recently as 1 December 1972, the Chinese have again asserted that neither coups nor elections can supplant "armed struggle" as the only way to attain national power. When it is expedient, for reasons of national interest, to. disengage from insurgencies elsewhere in. the world, the Chinese leader who desires such disengage-' ment (Chou En-lai is the most important) must persuade: Mao that a particular insurgency must.not be openly supported by Peking. And Mao apparently will accept disengagement from some but not from all insurgencies Peking had been supporting. The Philippines case shows continuing political support and favor towards the man ‘who is leading “armed struggle" in the islands. -91- _ ~SEGRET Sison, the carrier of Mao's policy, has claimed that during his mid-1967 visit to China, he wrote an article on "revolutionary art" -- Mao's Yenan lectures on art were being publicized in mainland media. at the time -- which he used for a speech at Yenan, and that he was told by the Chinese that it would be carried-in the PRC's Foreign Ministry journal and that copies would be sent to PRC embassies, It is credible that: the Chinese would flatter him in this way; this flattery was not only recompense for his support but also a further effort by the Chinese to solidify the hold Mao's policies had acquired over his mind. In June 1967, .the factional split between Sison and the more conservative PKP leaders increased follow-. ing his return from discussions in Peking. Sison ac- _cused the older leaders of bungling the entire revolu- tion over the years and attacked some of them as "revi-. Sionists." His group began openly to glamorize the frenzied actions of Mao's Red Guards and tried to place _a Red Guard discipline over his Patriotic Youth organi- zation, having established a Red Guard group complete with Mao badges and red arm bands inside it in August 1967, Some of his group began to carry firearms. It was,in the summer of 1967, after his China briefings, that Sison reportedly established close contacts with one of the Huk commanders, probably on the advice of the Chinese. - The strong stress on armed struggle" made in the Chinese articles of May on the Philippine revolution and reference to the active in- surgents reflected, among other things, Peking's counsel that Sison look to the insurgents for action, ally himself with them, and subordinate their activities to his political. control. 292% : maar Within the following two years, that was roughly what Sison was successful in doing. Sison formed the new, pro-Chinese Philippine. Communist Party-Marxist/ _Leninist (PKP-M/L) when, on 26 December 1968, he took his followers out of the old, neutral PKP, breaking with the old-line leader Pedro Taruc and his followers. As for the military arm of the new Party, Sison managed to acquire this component of his new organization through an alliance. "Commander Dante," a former old-~- line Huk, split with his Huk chief and joined Sison, | and formed the New People's Army (NPA), the formation _date being declared as 29 March 1969, : i In line with what Peking at that time in 1969 was prescribing for insurgencies in Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia -- namely, that the party lead the army -- the NPA was made subordinate to the party, headed by Chairman of the Central Committee Sison,. by mid-August 1969 STson ha come the “boss” of army leader "Commander Dante," . and had even begun to share the functi on of devisin military strategy for NPA operations. ae Sison, "Dante," and one other OLrricer forme @ party's Military Commission which oversaw the NPA ~- a Chinese-type arrangement for ensuring that "the party controls the gun." In Peking's | first article indicating endorsement, in public, of the NPA, the point was: made explicitly that the NPA .is "1éd by the party.” .(NCNA article of 4 August 1970) Friction developed between Sison and "Dante," stemming partly from Sison's pretensions to being a military strategist and his. wish to decide on the tim- ing and location of firefights. te eceel goon formed a new politburo of Seven men in ovember 1971. There was no military representation on the reorganized main directing body. It did not even include "Dante," the’ acting commander-in-chief of the NPA. at that time, Seana ep at t weak, and tn- appy with the ascendancy of the ex-Philippine Armed Forces Lt.. Victor Corpus --who had defected to Sison's forces in December 1970 -- in the NPA leadership.. It is probable that Sison already has named a new NPA commander- in-chief. Corpus would be the most likely choice, In any case, the involved Chinese have made it clear that they want Sison's men to continue to repudiate "the roving-rebel ideology" of the old Huks. (NCNA article of 26 December 1971) The insurgents seem to have Been careful from the start to emplace themselves in secure areas, Within one year of its formation, the NPA had moved | the area of its military operations from central Luzon ~- the old bailiwick of the Huks -- to Isabela Province in northeast Luzon, where the presence of sympathizers (particularly the local governor) facilitated survival, and where the terrain (surrounding mountains) enabled Sison and "Dante" to expand their forces in relative security. Sison himself removed from Manila to the mountain area in May 1969, and this physical removal complete é trans-. Ormation of Sison from urban Communist radical into rural Maoist insurgent. ‘However, he moves freely, and on occasion returns to Manila, covertly, to contact non-Communist anti-government leaders, ° The Maoist orientation of Sison oo his insurgent . allies is apparent in many aspects. Political methods and guerrilla tactics have been taken from Mao's writings by Sison, who has annoyed other leaders by reiterating the Chinese hero's ideas on guerrilla warfare inces- santly,. Sison disseminates these ideas throughout the PKP-M/L and NPA in indoctrination materials and in the lectures he gives as Director of the party's School of Mao Tse-tung Thought (located near San Guillermo in cen- tral Isabela. Province). As for more practical Maoist policies, the emphasis given to building political organizations from the grass roots and making base areas secure politically (as well as militarily) is apparent () a 3 ANd Pra OM Peking had Sin tne form of NCNA broadcast of 24 August: which noted that NPA "propa- ganda teams" had been active, that "militia" organiza-— tions had been established in some villages, that "despotic landlords" and "local tyrants" had been pun- ished, and that Mao's ideas had been propagated among the “poor peasants." Bs \ Documents disseminated by an NPA commander at: Concepcion, Tarlac Province, and retrieved in June 1970 by Philippine security forces, devoted considerable space to the need for establishing good political rela- tions with the surrounding peasantry. Another point of Maoist emphasis was the step-by-step procedure for establishing, expanding, and sustaining "'base areas" which were to be converted into "liberated areas" later on,. The instructions were: to begin by in- vestigation of local conditions (NPA documents’ captured - earlier had contained copies of one of Mao's works relevant to this first step: Rural Surveys of 1941), then to conduct "mass work" (agitation oar organiza- _ tion), and finally to form party organizations and military units in the. local areas, Yet another point of stress was on formation of militia forces, or self-defense corps, under the guise _-95- _ SECRET —_ ee TE of what appeared to be legitimate associations called Barrio f[i.e., Village} Youth Organizations, This activity was intended to help mobilize for the NPA an- entire community and place it on a virtual war footing "in defense of a barrio” against government. forces. A similar course had been followed in Burma and Thailand, . As for improving the military integrity of the NPA and — the militia, one document mentioned the existence of a Lin Piao Military Academy -~ a special branch of Sison's School of Mao Tse~tung Thought. (No doubt the Academy's name has since been changed.) The NPA, according to an NCNA broadcast of 21 December. 1971, has its own official newspaper (as the PKP-M/L has its own), and it is clear from what Peking media stressed that the NPA has been tasked with making political cadres out of its fighting men, The documents also indicate very detailed guidance on Maoist military tactics, particularly on the need of the NPA to con- “centrate superior forces to strike a small government unit, to make quick- decision attacks, and to achieve maximum surprise. North Vietnamese insurgent experi- -ences are also. studied as supplementary materials to- the main Maoist corpus. Within NPA-controlled areas, other Maoist forma- tions -- in addition to the existing village "revolu- tionary committees,” "propaganda teams," and "local | militia" -- have been reported in early 1972. Some "communes" have been established and captured documents reveal plans to set up "people's courts" composed of PKP-M/L, NPA, and village "revolutionary committee" representatives -- a system which would further strengthen. insurgent political control and increase popular sup- port. The Philippine security forces are impressed by the variety of practical organizations being used to ‘secure rural areas politically, and they are aware of the good reputation the insurgents have acquired in some areas as defenders of the people and their. rights. ~96- ET - a Basic programmatic materials ntain additional indications of strong ties between the in- surgents and Peking. The Program of Action of the PKP-M/L politburo (written Sometime between December 1968 and June 1969) lays it down that the © party must maintain "unity" with the CCP and must comply with Mao's "Thought.'' This would seem to mean subor- dination to CCP policies and ideological positions. The Constitution dectares the goal of the party to be the “overthrow”. of the Philippine government by armed force: Mad’s prescription. ‘Immediate practical steps to be taken on this long road are: to rebuild the ~ party through recruitment, to set. up "base areas" in the countryside from which "armed struggle" is to be carried out, and to expand territory gradually. Peking, for its part, transmitted via NCNA a 26 December 1970 statement .of the PKP-M/L Central Com- mittee which stated that the party adhered to Mao's "Thought" and was pursuing "to the end” the purge of. the old "Lava revisionist renegade clique and the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique” -- reference to the pro-Soviet Lava (arrested in 1964), Huk commander . Sumulong (captured in September 1970 by Philippines security forces), and old-line PKP leader Taruc (killed in October 1970). Subsequent Peking~carried statements ‘of the Philippine insurgents led by Sison strongly - suggest that a dispute was waged within the old PKP over the wisdom of forming the NPA, An NPA statement of 29 March 1971 (carried by NCNA on 10 April 1971) declared that the "complete codlapse" of the Taruc- Sumulong “gangster clique” in "less than two years after its mass criticism and repudiation" had "totally vindicated the correctness of the establishment of the NPA under a Communist party inspired by Marxism-Leninism Mao Tse-tung Thought." (emphasis supplied} The old ~97- PKP in 1972 has shown some signs of being evivod: -- or temporarily propped up --'as it has tried to compete for support among urban. intellectuals by engaging in acts - of violence (bomb-planting and assassination). But. it clearly is now the inferior Communist Party in numbers , morale, and appeal among youthful radicals. As in the cases of Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia, small advances in diplomacy did not curtail Peking's support for the Sison insurgents, When in mid-May 1971 two unofficial Philippine economic.missions visited China and were received by Chou for a "friendly" conver- |: sation, Peking had already lumped Presdient Marcos to- _ gether with Ne Win in a Voice of the People of Burma (VPB) broadcast on 18 April which declared that these two leaders could not prevent the "doom of being overthrown by their own peoples." Following the economic missions' visits, NCNA cited a 21 May 1971 PKP-M/L newspaper article which praised the NPA exploits against the forces of the ~ Philippine "reactionary government." And following the .- completion of the first major Philippine-PRC trade agree- ment in late August 1971, NCNA carried two news articles on the 26 August destruction aa bare government heli- copters by the NPA, Peking has carried reports indicating the areas. of guerrilla activity and some of the Maoist military techniques being used. The insurgents were reported as operating not only in, northeastern Luzon but also in ; other Luzon provinces, and in the Visayas and Mindanao. In February 1972, the saad Se claimed that Untts of the NPA are now 1 eaeioets carrying out armed struggle in northern Luzon, eentral Luzon, southern Luzon, and the western Visayas. In Mindanao, the party and the NPA have deployed cadres to train fighters from the poor peasants and oppressed national minorities to fight the landgrabbers and the reacttonary: armed forces. (NCNA excerpts of Ang Bayan article, broadcast by Radto Peking on 8 May 1872) : The PKP-M/L organ Ang Bayan claimed in late April 1972. that "regular fighters ave increased eight-fold since 1969 and that "mass" support has been extended an to 18 provinces of Luzon and western Visayas. Ang Bayan. - also claimed that the NPA now has the capability "to launch tactical offensives within the strategic defense," the meaning of "tactical offensives" (as can be derived © from insurgent materials) probably being quick-decision ambush actions against government patrols of platoon size. (NCNA report of 29 April 1972) Sison's party organ on 9 September 1972 carried a completely Mao- - oriented report on how NPA forces had been able to. thwart the encirclement campaign of the Philippine army's "reactionary" troops. "The NPA concentrated - its main forces whilé evading the enemy main forces | and annihilated small and isolated enemy units." (NCNA excerpts of Ang Bayan article, broadcast by Radio Peking on 5 December 1972) : The Philippine insurgency has been expanding. under Sison's control, even though its numbers are small. er € party has a membership ra) ,UUU Members. € strength of the NPA Seana "800 regulars armed with modern weapons, Orming 72 regular squads, 10 regular platoons, and one regular company. The ‘NPA also commands "1,500 local guerrilla: fighters armed mainly with old single-: action rifles and homemade rifles of the shotgun type" and about "16,000 militia members...armed mainly with homemade guns"? and spears and bolos. Some of the guerrilla units have been formed into squads. and ~99- a ¥ platoons, With the exception of the document's figure on militia members, its totals are close to. those of a Philippine intelligence estimate completed on 30 June 1972, The estimate puts the figures at 1,090 regular armed cadres and 2,158 "service-support" per- sonnel, ; There are many reports of student radicals, from Sison's youth organization and from other groups, helping in the rural expansion~recruitment drives, using such techniques of group indoctrination as teach-ins and live-ins among the populace. The old Huk organization insurgents are also active, but they do not pose the long-term threat that the more cohesive, disciplined, and politicized NPA insurgents represent. The main source of arms and ammunition for the NPA is internal, that is, equipment comes from combat captures, “purchases from gun-traffickers, and weapons roundups (or collection drives) carried out in the islands, In order to conceal the sordid, covert nature of some acquisitions. of weapons, the insurgents claim that they are using primarily. the prescription -- a Maoist one -- of obtaining weapons from the enemy, Mao had said.of China! $ civil war that “the enemy is our supply sergeant" -- a position” now found convenient for Peking to paraphrase in connection with weapons- supplying of the NPA. Thus NCNA on 3 March 1972 made the following excerpts of a PKP-M/L Henepepet article when discussing weapons arqutst edo: Confronted with the large-scale’ reerutt- ment of commanders and fightere for the NPA, the party and the people's army are fulfilling thetr arms requirement primarily by relying on their own . strength, The primary source of arma and military equipment for the people's rie: ts the battlefront, More than 0 percent of the weapons of the people’ - amy come from the Rica ae Vietortes ~100- in ambushes and ‘vatds ensure avme and ammunition for the Red fightere, (emphasis supplied) © , ’ Given the availability of smuggled guns and the practice of many radicals of acquiring and storing weapons in. urban areas, the 90 percent figure probably exaggerates the proportion taken in combat. The newspaper article sensibly does not indicate the source of the other.10 percent of acquisitions. 2 Reports since 1969 of vessels bringing in mili- tary aid secretly from China or North Vietnam are un- confirmed. However, on 3 July 1972, govern sel (a 25-ton fishing trawler) lightering its cargo ashore onto the sparsely populated east coast of Luzon near the remote town, Palanan. Government troops sent to the scene two days later to seize the stranded vessel were directly | engaged in a firefight by local NPA forces. . The. vessel ‘finally was captured together with the offloaded cargo (cached inland at an NPA camp). The captured equipment included 737 M-14. Titles 158,113 rounds of ammunition for the M-1I4s, five an itank rocket launchers (possibly PRC-made), 564 40mm rockets, a "ees : field telephone switchboard, and seven field telephone ‘ : sets. The equipmert is’ expensive, Some of the weapons, especially the rocket launchers, are not usually available to local gun-traffickers. More than 200 documents were seized, including the ship's log, entries which suddenly énded in early Juné 1972, presumably to conceal the sensitive matter of the ship's onloading destination, The vessel had offloaded another military cargo at Palanan earlier, in May. © The vessel originally had been a fishing boat, which was purchased in Japan in April by a ‘radical Filipino and former friend of Sison. . There is no certain way to determine the actual source of the weapons and equipment. In any case, the discovery of the vessel, the - evidence that it had made a previous supply run’ in May 1972 for the. NPA, and the nature of its cargo re-. veal a new dimension in NPA strategy to Philippine officials. That is, larger amounts of weapons and a _nhew category of arms -- i.e., rocket launchers -~- are being absorbed on Luzon for military operations, Aside. from arms and ammunition, another source of material support -- namely, money to be used for various activities of Sison's followers -- seems to be locally acquired. Money is derived by Sison's insurgents mainly from the local communities, pri- marily from the local Chinese. . Some of the money comes in the form of voluntary contributions from sympathizers in the Communist cause, Some of it comes from out- -and-" out extortion -- i.e., from "protection money." There is. some ‘evidence, however, of a'tie-in with the Chinese Communists as the ultimate source of part of his total take of funds, The evidence goes back several years, and it is. difficult to determine how much of it is still valid. in making contacts with the Chinese Communists Leulty by visits to Hong ~104-- Much of this fave D Bt Or Sénding money to the main- land from Overseas Chinese sources, but some of it is for smuggling goods back into the Philippines. The goods are then resold, and ultimately the money’ reportedly is used to help finance insurgent opera- tions. It is not always clear whether local Chinese businessmen contribute to Sison's coffers as pro- Maoist sympathizers or for "protection" from the in- surgents. also extracts money and Tice On Various 0 che islands in the form of a regular "tax," Aside from covert contacts probably in existence between Sison and Chinese Communist agents, Peking may well have other lines of communication to other of its sympathizers in the Philippines. ee Ce naee nance apereeie pre diy Newertheress, as fax as intelligence operations are concerned, it is not unlikely that Peking has had, and now sustains, its own information lines directly into the Philippines through agents acting in the Chinese communities there and shuttling between the islands and Hong Kong.. Training of the Maoist insurgents is primarily - “carried out in the Philippines, where locals are re- cruited and intensively indoctrinated, However, aan : ndEw a ha éing trained in China and Algeria. -106= . On the diplomatic level, Peking's policy can be — expected to move toward rationality by .small degrees. This would mean more people-to-people contacts and, eventually, some official contacts. For more than a year -- that is, since June 1971, and even several months earlier -- NCNA articles broadcast by Peking on developments in the Philippines have shown a diplomatic sensibleness in avoiding, for the most part, attacks on the Marcos administration by name. More recently, Peking was careful to use eoreign press reports to — imply its criticism of Marcos' declaration of. martial law (22. September 1972), and this particular restraint has been maintained. This is in line with the low profile of insurgency-support that Peking has adopted in open media, Peking desires non-official relations ‘now and official reldtions later with Manila. -But not. 24075: at the expense of ending all political su; pport to the. Sison forces. When President Marcos' brother in-law, Governor Romualdez, visited Peking in: February 1972, Chou used ambiguous language to set forth the Chinese posi "Sar that China does not interfere in the domestic affairs of other.countfies and does not believe that revolu- ; tions can be exported; but he then said that China is committed "to support" national liberation movements from imperialist interference. China does not inter- - fere, China supports. Manila was left to interpret the precise meaning of this position. The Chinese will probably continue their broad- : casting of reports on developments in the insurgency, ae ae On the one hand, Radio Peking broadcasts will probably ot. continue to avoid direct.attacks on the Marcos ad- ‘ministration by name, using foreign press sources to relay such criticism, On the other hand, the VMR will probably be used, as it has‘been up until. the present, to carry vituperative attacks on the Manila government. The Chinese do not operate a separate radio station for the Philippine insurgency; their policy has been to peo use the VMR. For example, on 9 September 1972, the 3 _VMR was used to broadcast to Malaysia and Singapore i a statement from Sison's PKP-M/L which derided the -. : government of RESSEGEAY mares as a "puppet" regime of the U.S. : The dedication of Sison to Mao's revolutionary views marks him as the most fervent Mao-idolizer of all _ pro-Peking foreign Communist leaders, In practical terms, this means he is conducting himself obediently in ‘the Sino-Soviet dispute in criticizing Moscow by x name and expanding the Mao-model revolution in the islands. Thus in his letter to the CCP on the 50th anniversary of the Chinese party (July 1971), aiscii ‘personally disparaged the "Soviet Union" as ‘the center of modern revisionism." He was emphatic in dedicating his party to sustained learning from the Chinese meget: The Communtet Party of the Philip- pines emulates the CCP. It constantly atrives to grasp the teachings of Chair- man Mao. The living etudy and applica- tion of Marxtsm-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought in Philippine conditions te today the main concern of the Communtst Party of the Philippines. (Sison message published by WCWA, 10 July 1971) _Sison spoke also of moving the insurgency into the stage of "socialist revolution," which is to be the final revolutionary stage before seizure of national power. Even the future form of the Communist state is to be the "people's democracy" of Mao's terminology, On 3 June 1972, an NCNA article declared the final goal of the Philippine insurgents led by the PKP-M/L to be such a Maoist "people's democracy." On 5 December 1972, an NCNA article praised the NPA for using Mao's. tactics to’ destroy "reactionary" traops. Sison is acting to win important non-Communist political support for his insurgency, and has dangled the bait of'a share in a future revolutionary, govern- ment to prospective allies, = 109- ET Sison apparently -is also trying to establish a working alliance with the. Muslim dissidents in the- southern Philippines. ‘Peking's two-level policy of diplomacy and insurgency-support. probably will continue. As for Sison's policy, he probably will adhere’ to Mao's prescription for waging a protracted war, only gradually expanding party ranks, the NPA, and terri- torial holdings, ; “ : Malaysia West Peking has the overall guiding role’ in’the*re-: - vivied insurgency in, northern West Malaysia (south of the Thai border). Its dominant influence is based on its control of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). | This party is virtually an operational wing of the CCP, and in the late 1940s and early 1950s some.top MCP of- ficials held dual membership in the CCP and the MCP. Top MCP officials may still be controlled by such dual membership today. In addition to the organizational — tie, the strong racial tie is very important. in sustain- ing the subordination of the MCP and its insurgents to. op ae ete rit, ten ta ee an ‘i ‘ 614804 22-72 CA mmun st Insurgency sm THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ‘the parent Chinese party: most of the insurgent Com- munists are ethnic Chinese. . Malaysia's Chinese school system has radical youth organizations which act as recruiting centers for the MCP, and recruiting in the. countryside is also most effective among Chinese. The MCP today shows’ none of the independence : which marks:a free, unsubordinated Communist party. It obedientiy adopts all CCP positions in. thé Sino-° Soviet dispute without variation, It issues servile statements of tribute to the CCP. and its leaders. For example, the 1 April 1972: MCP Central Committee letter of condolence on the death of CCP Politburo member Hsieh Fu-chih pledged to take Hsieh's revolu-. tionary attitude "as a model-of our learning." More- _over, from 24-27 May 1972.the Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VMR) -- the Chinese-run covert radio ; station broadcasting from Changsha, Hunan in south- central China -- imposed on insurgents in the field a series of broadcasts carrying the complete, text of Mao's Talks at the Yenan: Forum on Art and Literature (1942). Mainiand cddres were subjected. to the same ' study task on the 30th anniversary of Mao's Talks, The broadcasts implied that the MCP insurgents in the field were under the same CCP ideological and ‘organi- zational discipline as mainland cadres. The most important contribution Peking makes. to the insurgency, is high-level guidance, indoctrination, and encouragement.- There is abundant. evidence that. insurgents in the field use broadcasts of the VMR to set themes for indoctrination lectures, Many of the broadcasts used for political-toughening also carry detailed information on PRC developments |. through the. broadcasting of articles in the Peking People's Dail and Red Flag. The organizing and politieet- toug ening ‘role of this radio station's broadcasts goes beyond mere revolutionary rhetoric and becomes practical aid. Most of. the ausungenee in net hers West Malaysia are Chinese, not Malays (who distrust Communist con- cepts), and some have been infiltrated from-China. But most of them have been in the field since the end of a the Emergency (1948-1960), when Malaysian security forces chased them into southern Thailand, © Many new cadres have been recruited in the field and never have been ; to the mainland. Because of the difficult jungle ter- — rain and the cooperation of the local inhabitants in West Malaysia -- mostly cooperation by.local Chinese -- Malaysian security forces are encountering difficulties in counterinsurgency operations. Peking now seems to. be determined to broaden the ranks of the MGP and its combat arm, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) so that more Malays are brought in. The insurgents are going about this kind of party-building in a gradual, deliberate way, but the resistance of the Malays to Communist appeals will continue to aDeBe the pace of SRPENe tons Chinese support of the insurgency is maintained under a clear distinction between government and party ‘relations. Like the situation existing between Peking on the one hand, and Rangoon, Bangkok, and Manila on the other hand, improvements in government relations do not ‘carry with them a reduction or cessation of PRC support of the Communist insurgents; ‘Mao is apparently, unwill- ing to close down support, as was done in the period just after World War II by’ the Soviets and in the mid-1950s by the Chinese during the policy of Bandung-~inspired peaceful coexistence, Ending of support was criticized as a "mistake" at the peak of Mao's Cultural Revolu- tion in August 1967 in Peking by a “Malayan Communist leader, who is a client of the CCP. In a real sense, PRC support of the insurgency is a continuation of Mao's thinking during his Cultural Revolution regarding nearby guerrilla wars. ~114~ “SEGRE. ne ne NEE The support,. in contrast to the direct support given the Burma and Thailand insurgencies, does not include direct physical inputs, for obvious logistical reasons, ‘THInNese junks a gedly y Peninsula. There is, however, no J sides 0 ala confirmation of these claims, and no credible instance . of such a landing. But money for the insurgent cause probably is - a different, and less difficult, problem of aid inputs. Couriers using Hong Kong and Macao from the mainland, and couriers using these colontal money-markets coming from West Malaysia, would have no-real trouble in giv- ing and receiving financial aid. _ The impetus for reviving the insurgency in West Malaysia came from Peking, and at the time of the peak of Mao's "anti-revisionist" Cultural Revolution, in mid-1967, By mid-1968, some. 600 armed Communist in- _. surgents, who had huddled in sanctuaries in southern . ° Thailand where they had been chased in the late 1950s by Malaysian security forces, began to move gradually from inactive to active status undér.stimulation from Peking. They moved back across the border, first to reconnoiter and then permanently to position themselves in small base areas in northern West Malaysia. The CTs -- that is, Communist Terrorists or members of the MNLA -- numbered about 600 regular armed cadres -115s - at the close of the Emergency (1948-1960), expanded to about 1,000 by mid-1968, to about 1,600 in mid-1970, and to about 1,800 in mid-1972. The slow upward pro- gression in the number of armed insurgents represents a positive gain, and the existence of small bases capable of accommodating about 40-60 CTs points toward a long- term potential expansion. The kindling spark was presumably in the form of a secret directive during Mao's Cultural Revolution, but the public form of the spark came as an article written by a Chinese Communist client in Peking: a Malay Communist, P.V. Sarma, Chief of the Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL). The exhortations in the article, which was published in the MNLL's Mao-line journal. in August 1967, in effect directed the Malayan Communists to get out of front activities in Malayan parliamentary politics and out of the southern Thailand sanctuaries, to take up their weapons, and to start organizing themselves for serious work: guerrilla war- fare, It insisted that "armed struggle" was the onl way to attain political power, that the MCP had made a serious "mistake" in abandoning armed struggle just after World War II, arid that the situation was becoming favorable for a resumption of guerrilla warfare to be handled in a well-organized way. The article of Sarma had considerable signi- ficance. The fact that this: key article was written while the author was in Peking as the representative of the MNLL and that it contained Mao-type exhortations on the absolute need for "armed struggle" as the only road. to power in Malaysia indicates that it represented a Chinese Communist initiative. Peking's ideological position that "armed struggle" should be the main form of struggle in Malaysia was affirmed in the formal MCP statement of 1 June 1968. Army-insurgent work would Most of. the wauepents in jetheen West Malaysia are Chinese, not Malays (who distrust Communist con- cepts), and some have been infiltrated from-China. But most of them have been in the field since. the end of _ the Emergency (1948-1960), when Malaysian security forces chased them into southern Thailand. “Many new cadres have been recruited in the field and never have been ; to the mainland. Because of the difficult jungle ter- - rain and the cooperation of the local inhabitants in West Malaysia ~- mostly cooperation by.local Chinese -- Malaysian security forces are encountering difficulties in counterinsurgency operations, Peking now seems to. be determined to broaden the ranks of the MCP and its combat arm, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) so that more Malays are brought in. The insurgents are going about this kind of party-building in a gradual, deliberate way, but the resistance of the Malays to Communist eppeate will continue to impede the pace: of eapane roms Chinese support of the insurgency is maintained under a clear distinction between government and party ‘relations. Like the situation existing between Peking on the one hand, and Rangoon, Bangkok, and Manila on the other hand, improvements in government relations do not ‘carry with them a reduction or cessation of PRC support of the Communist insurgents, -Mao is apparently, unwill- ing to close down support, as was done in the period just after World War II by the Soviets and in the mid-1950s by the Chinese during thé policy of Bandung-inspired peaceful coexistence, Ending of support was criticized as a "mistake" at the peak of Mao's Cultural Revolu- tion in August 1967 in Peking by a “Malayan Communist leader, who is a client of the CCP. In a real sense, PRC support of the insurgency is a continuation of Mao's thinking during his Cultural Revolution regarding nearby guerrilla wars. ’ -114= The support,. in contrast to the direct support given the Burma and Thailand insurgencies, does not include direct physical inputs, for obvious logistical a ee Sides 0 alay Peninsula, There is, however, no confirmation of these claims, and no credible instance . of such a-landing,. But money for the insurgent cause probably is a different, and less difficult, problem of aid inputs. Couriers using Hong Kong and Macao from the mainland, and couriers using these colontal money-markets coming from West Malaysia, would have no.real trouble in giv- ing and receiving financial aid.. . The impetus for reviving the insurgency in West Malaysia came from Peking, and at the time of the peak of Mao's "“anti-revisionist" Cultural Revolution, in mid-1967, By mid-1968, some. 600 armed Communist in- surgents,; who had huddled in sanctuaries in southern Thailand where they had been chased in the late 1950s by Malaysian security forces, began to move gradually . — from inactive to active status under stimulation from Peking. They moved back across the border, first to reconnoiter and then permanently to position themselves in small base areas in northern West Malaysia. The CTs -- that is, Communist Terrorists or members of the MNLA -- numbered about 600 regular armed cadres ~415%- at the close of the Emergency (1948-1960), expanded to . about 1,000 by mid-1968, to about 1,600 in mid-1970, and to about 1,800 in mid-1972,. The. slow upward pro- gression in the number of armed insurgents represents a positive gain, and the existence of small bases capable of accommodating about 40-60 CTs points toward a long- term potential expansion. The kindling spark was presumably in the form of a secret directive during Mao's Cultural Revolution, but the public form of the spark came as an article written by a Chinese Communist client in Peking: a Malay Communist, P.V. Sarma, Chief of the Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL). The exhortations in the article, which was published in the MNLL's Mao-line journal. in August 1967, in effect directed the Malayan Communists to get out of front activities in Malayan parliamentary politics and out of the southern Thailand Sanctuaries, to take up their weapons, and to start organizing themselves for serious work: guerrilla war-~ fare, It insisted that "armed struggle” was the only way to attain political power, that the MCP had made a serious "mistake" in abandoning armed struggle just after World War II, and that the situation was becoming favorable for a resumption of guerrilla warfare to be handled in a well-organized way. The article of Sarma had considerable signi- ficance. The fact that this:key article was written while the author was in Peking as the representative of the MNLL and that it contained Mao-type exhortations on ~ the absolute need for "armed struggle" as the only road to power in Malaysia indicates that it represented a Chinese Communist initiative. Peking's ideological position that “armed struggle" should be the main form of struggle in Malaysia was affirmed in the formal MCP statement of 1 June 1968. Army-insurgent work would replace political-front work and "parliamentary" politics. The statement was another indication of MCP subordination te the parent Chinese party. Thus the stage of beginning the armed struggle was reached in West Malaysia in June 1968. The same held true for the beginning of political agitation among the "masses": also in June, the MCP issued a covert "directive" ordering the revival of political-indoctrina- tion of the populace for the purpose of preparing safe areas in which the insurgency could take hold. The ‘course of insurgent military actions bétween 1968 and 1972 in the field demonstrates that Peking and its client, the MCP, were not engaged only in the rhetoric of revolu- tion, but were also engaged in the real thing. That is, Peking's support was not merely token aid, not simulated aid of no real account. On the conirarv, Peking's guidance, indoctrination, and encourageme + activities were positive concrete acts zcsigned tr ‘iave the effect of reviving an insurgency and making sure that the revival did not die at its rebirth, a The Peking-inspired revival of the armed insurgency can be fixed to the date of 17 June 1968 wher a force of the.MNLA for the first’ time since the late 1350s attacked a Malaysian security force unit on Malaysian territory. This well-crained Communist force numbered about 40 armed and uniformed men, and their amubush war effectively carried out, The evidence is that the revival of the insurgency in mid-1968 reflected from the start considerable military competence: good planning, tactical caution, good execution. CT units were armed and given uniforms in southern Thailand and were infiltrated skill- ‘fully into Malaysian territory with the initial mission of reconnoitering and re-establishing contacts with underground insurgents. Their mission later became that of making selective attacks on Malaysian security force =~117- ~SEGRET units and undertaking selective sabotage of key instal- . lations in West Malaysia. Toward the end of 1968, the number of MNLA -- or CT -- incursions from southern Thailand gradually increased, In late 1970,.it was ; solidly confirmed that small groups of CT infiltrators had permanently established small bases for inside- Malaysia operations -- a development occuring for the first time since the late 1950s. Later, the base camps were reported to be capable of servicing 40-60 CTs, as they included food caches... The CTs were still building their units and were not in a phase of general offensive operations, But they did engage in selective strikes against government - forces. A major incident involving the mining by CT forces of the main west coast road linking Malaysia ‘and Thailand took place in late October 1969. On 10 December, a strategic installation was hit: a group of CTs blew up the 100-foot-long railway bridge on Malaysian territory about two miles southwest of Padang Besar, Perlis Province, severing for a few days the main railway link between Thailand and Malaysia. Gradually the CTs increased the number of cross-border «_ incursions, their calculation having been to demon- strate their ability to operate on Malaysian territory without, suffering excessive combat losses. They wanted ‘to test their own ability to safely infiltrate, to hit important installations and roads, and to move bigger units across undetected. The planning was careful, the pace deliberate, and the actions generally low-risk. Peking's role in the overall guidance of these developments is further suggested by its establishing, on PRC soil, the clandestine radio station -- the VMR -- at a time when CT units first began. to be’ embedded across the southern Thailand border. Inaugurated on 15 November 1969, the radio station claimed to be the =118- “SEGREL cee cased "Malayan people's own radid“station."”. ‘Actually, -ac- --. cording to technical observations, the VMR broadcasts from a location near Changsha, in- Yunnan Province in south-central China... The November broadcast declared that the VMR : »..wtll exert utmost efforts to propagate Maratem-Leniniam-Mao Tsetung Thought and the polietesa of the MCP...tt will prepare revolutionary public opinion for the taunehing of an extensive people's war in Malaya with.the purpose of crushing imperialism, modern revistoniam, and all- reacttonaries at home, and establishing . '. @ people's republie of Malaya. (emphasis supplied) aan rr od In order to set forth "policies" and prepare "revolu- tionary" public opinion, the VMR has been broadcasting to Malaysia and Singapore 56 hours per week. On oc-~ casion, an entire week is devoted to one major subject. - For example, from 4 to 10 October 1972, the VMR devoted - its time exclusively to broadcasting the MCP's New Constitution. . Since the fall of 1970, Peking has been sanitiz-. ing Radio Peking replays of VMR broadcasts, editing , out derogatory references to the Malaysian leaders by. name, But this effort to improve the diplomatic image to foreign audiences has not changed the nature of the broadcasts of the VMR which are beamed into Malaysia and Singapore. These broadcasts continue to direct the _ insurgents to sustain their "armed struggle" in a pro- tracted way against government. forces, 2119+ In order to increase the mass: elaine of the MCP, the Chinese have decided to cross ethnic lines in setting forth their Communist appeals, It isa. significant fact that PRC- directed VMR broadcasts are made in three. languages -+ Chinese, Malay, and Tamil -- — ‘with almost equal time to Malay and Chinese. Thus despite the fact that most pro-Communist elements in - West Malaysia are Chinese, Peking is actively trying to make inroads among the Malays, The strong emphasis placed on influencing Malays toward the Communist in- surgency reflects Peking's awareness that the guer- ° rilla-war cannot expand in a big way in actual ter-'. ritory seized without. bringing in this dominant national group. According to a report of the summer of 1971, Malay CTs (as distinct from Chinese insurgent cadres) were being used in a program to help win the support of non-Communist Malays. Members of the primarily Malay 10th Regiment in the MNLA based just nerth of the border in Thailand had begun to cross ‘into. Malaysia more ard more frequently to-indoctrinate rural Malays near the border. In,addition to this new recruitment trend, Peking has dropped its critic- isms of "Malay chauvinism" and the alleged persecution of Chinese and other minorities in Malaysia. Peking had been cartying out a policy of unity- of-all-nationalities in Burma and Thailand to expand insurgent ranks.there. That a similar policy was — ‘operative in Malaysia is indicated by the new appeals to Malays in the field and in Peking- originated guidance. An example of such guidance’ is the VMR- editorial of 29 April 1972, later carried by NCNA on 4 May in excerpt form,,. declaring that the MCP is the real representative of "all nationalities" of the — country, For the most part,. however, Malays (in contrast to the Chinese) have remained impervious . to the influence of such Maoist indoctrination, Since the revival of the insurgency in 1968, ‘Peking has been working to raise the determination of the fighters to persist in a protracted war. Morale-building broadcasts are exaggerating the losses of government units whenever a minor clash between Malaysian security.forces and. the MNLA in border areas occurs, For example, on 3 July 1970, NCNA, quoting’ the China-based radio station, VMR, "claimed that the CTs' 12th Regiment had shot down a fighter- bomber and a helicopter and had - “damaged another heli- copter. It also insisted that "the broad masses in .- the enemy-occupied areas are waging more-.extensive armed struggle in enthusiastic response to the call of the — MCP," : ; The VMR continues to call for the "overthrow" of: the government, to declare Mao's road to be the "only" one to attain power, and to-remind MCP cadres that they "must" sustain their study of Mao's ideology. In a major editorial preeting the PRC's National Day, ~ the VMR ‘declared on 30 September 1972 that’ Soctaltat China ts an unshakable base avea for the world revolution... From thety protracted revolution- ary practtce, the people of our country have fully realized that to, overthrow an impertalist-cotonialist rule an thetr puppets, we must rely only on arme but not on ballot boxes, as waa potnted out in the important statement of the Central Committee of the uce of, 265 Apnee 1972 waco The Razak @lique ts shouting for the setting up of a national IEOREs and the 121- Lee Kuan Yew dlique has béen ataging: ite general elections comedy dramas... .. Their death-bed struggle cannot eave them from thetr doom.... We must rdtse etiltl! higher the’ great red banner of Marzism-Leninism~ Mao Teetung peahe nea (emphasia sup- pared, ; Subsequently,. the, insurgents have been told "to fight: - to the end" against the "Razak clique."': (VMR broad+ cast.of 4 November 1972) . ca Separating diplomacy out from] Peking's dual. policy of diplomacy-insurgency has been the task of Chou En-lai, who skillfully accentuated the positive during the May 1971 visit of the Malaysian trade delegation to Peking... Stressing diplomacy ,’ Chou seemed to accept Malaysia as one country:: he was. the. first Chinese leader to drop the usage, "Malaya," which had implied Peking's insistence (since the. formation of Malaysia as a Federation in 1963) that it was still unacceptable as a single new state. Chou tried-‘to stay away from explicit. and unequivocal statements regard- ing the insurgency half of Peking's policy toward Malaysia, when. ques- tioned abou eR f urgents;. Chou ‘told delégation members that Sovernnent: to- government relations were “different” from party-to-party rela- tions, The implication of this dodge was, as-in the - -case of Chou’s dodge on a similar: situation: in’ Burma,,. that Peking would not change its support for the Con- munist guerrillas. Actually, Chou's acceptance of Malaysia‘.as a Single country was only a dialectical tactic, to use- CCP language. Peking does not accept the existence of Malaysia. Chinese maps in 1965 did not show a federated Malaysia, but rather depicted Malaya as a separate country in the west and Sarawak and Sabah (i.e., most of North Borneo) as. still under colonial rule in the east. Peking's new. World Atlas, published in February 1972 by the PRC's Cartographic Institute and therefore representing the official view, contie tinues this policy. .It adheres to the pre-1963 name of "Malaya''-on its map pages, and in the commentary accompanying the maps, the relevant section is called ‘Malaya." It also maintains ambiguity about whether . Singapore is now an independent country or part of Malaya. Singapore is discussed under the "Malaya" section of the commentary, and on the: map pages, it is divided from "Malaya" by a regional rather than an international boundary. More importantly, . the commentary carries forward Peking's policy of supporting the insurgency, declaring in the "Malaya" section that "on.1 February 1949, a national libera- tion army was established under the leadership of the Malayan Communist Party; it actively began a people’s armed struggle." _ — Chinese officials in August 1971 denied to - Malaysian officials that they had any connection with the MCP, but refused to repeat this denial in Peking's | public media. At the same time, the VMR attacked "Razak and his ilk’ (VMR broadcast of 28 August 1971). Similar attacks. against the Malaysian leader have — been continued by the Chinese-run clandestine radio.i -123- : Keeping any improvement in diplomatic or trade relations as.a separate matter, which will not effect ‘support for the insurgency, Peking had its NCNA publish two articles, one on insurgericy in West Malaysia and the other on terrorist actions in East Malaysia (North ' Borneo), .using thé PRC-based VMR as the source of the commentaries. There have been small steps: toward im- proving relations. For example, a ping-pong delegation was sent, to Peking in mid-August 1972, the PRC ambas-: sador in Rangoon attended the Malaysian National. Day reception there on 31 August, and PRC central media - -avoided any mention of greetings from the MCP during the 1 October National Day celebrations in Peking. Nevertheless, the Chinese have not disengaged. from support of the insurgency, : Most recently, they again have refused to is disavow support of the MCP-led insurgents. In the course of this refusal, Chinese officials showed subtlety in trying to equate the anti-Razak broadcasts with. the - non-subversive, non-hostile, and non-revolutionary prac- tices of most Western countries in disseminating religious and political views abrodd. They adopted the tactic of making analogies where, in fact, sharp contrasts exist, Their analogy-making procedure avoided all mention ‘of the hostile nature of almost every VMR broadcast beamed into Malaysia which attack the domestic and foreign policies of Prime Minister Razak, as well as the Prime Minister personally as a "fascist dictator." More importantly, their procedure was an effort to conceal. the revolutionary-subversive intent of the broadcasts: -- namely, to provide guid- ance and to encourage the insurgents to do.a profes- sional job of expanding their armed units and the territory they hold. Despite. the. fact that the only condition ’ Malaysia placed on establishing relations with Peking was that the PRC renounce its support of |. the MCP, in late November 1972 such a promise was not given. . ' The Secretary General of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the US ambassador in Kuala — Lumpur on 7 December 1972 that during his November talks with Chou, Chou reviewed the PRC position on the MCP in. historical perspective, saying that China indeed supported the MCP in its struggle against British im- perzalism. . PRC support continued today as a matter of ideology -- Chou depicted it as "akin to religion" -- to provide moral support for other socialist movements. Chou went on to say that this continued support should not,be a matter of concern for'Kuala: Lumpur because . China would limit such support to the propaganda level. China would not engage in direct support of subversion against the Malaysian government. Chou also said that he was sure that this problem could be arranged between the two countries in a mutually satisfactory way, It is poSsible that Chou was hinting at. a déal whereby Kuala Lumpur would agree to recognize the PRC as the only _ government of China at the price of Peking ceasing its ~125- "-VMR broadcasts into ‘Malaysia, It is more likely, how- ever, that Chou's remark was intended to increase the optimism of Kuala Lumpur, about an end to Chinese sup- - port in order to combat, the retarding effect.on im- proved relations of counsel given Razak by Djakarta, Bangkok, and Manila. This would mean ‘a. greater in- clination in Kuala Lumpur to further improve relations without, beforehand, attaining a PRC promise to end vinsurgency- support. ; “In effect,. as late as November 1972, Chinese officials. explicitly refused to disavow support for . wars of "national liberation," stating to Maiaysian officials that Support in the form of radio broadcasts and sympathy "would continue." This Chinese position was a direct rebuff to an explicit Malaysian request aoe % ae for an end to PRC. ener eencye support. eS t ' The insurgents in Malaysia are not yet-in a general offensive stage. They are intensively work- .- ing mainly on establishing more bases and recruiting personnel. NCNA broadcasts (as well as the VMR) have noted this situation, reflecting an awareness in. Peking that the MNLA still represents a small insurgency - by contrast with the Malaysian security forces in northern West Malaysia. Possibly in the next year or two, the MNLA will resort to more offensive forays from base areas. Chinese political and radio propaganda . “support continues, and most eet will continue, at least until Mao dies, a ee ce a Ee eae "Malaysia ‘East: North Borneo’. Peking keeps its. political support of the insurg-. ency in West Malaysia separate from its support of the even smaller terrorist operations of-Communists in "North Kalimantan" -- the name Peking uses for North Borneo, consisting of Sarawak and Sabah in East Malaysia. The Chinese leaders were forced to a decision in 1963 when "North Kalimantan" became part of the new Malaysia Federa- tion: to accept the coalescence of the new Malaysia and encourage the Sarawak Communists to coalesce into one party with the MCP or to follow Sukarno's "confronta- : tion" policy of opposing the union of "North Kalimantan" . with Malaysia and thereby keeping the Sarawak Communists apart from tHe MCP. In deciding upon the.latter course, the Chinese leaders in 1964 established in Peking a front, the North Kalimantan National Liberation League, led by Sarawak Commmists, ‘Peking media thereafter touted the small insurgency in broadcasts as a revolu- tionary "armed struggle" distinct from MCP operations, The Sarawak Communists, desiring independence from Indonesia as well as from Malaysia, have also kept clear of-subordination to the Indonesian Communist Party. ee . Until recently, the Chinese have equivocated on the matter of the existence or non-existence of a separate, independent "North Kalimantan Communist Party.” earlier had indicated that a ; arawak Communist party had been established in January 1968 and that its party constitution exists as well as its covert apparatus, The Chinese now seem willing to recognize the party. Their Yunnan-based VMR during the périod between 2 and 12 December 1972 for the first time referred to the "North Kalimantan Communist Party," -127- oe suggesting Peking's apparent view that the Sarawak insurgents are somewhat. more unified than previously. and should be encouraged further to tighten up their organization. Chinese support of the North Kalimantan guer- rillas -~ the Sarawak Communist Organization {SCO}, a name used for convenience in referring to them -- con- sists of political guidance and encouragement. Ever since the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the Chinese - have housed and used various Sarawak Communist leaders and "front" leaders in Peking. The journal of the North Kalimantan National Liberation League, Liberation News, is printed in China. In the fall of 1965, when the Indonesian army began a large-scale. annihilation of Communists and suspected Communists, remnants of the Sarawak guerrillas moved across the border into the nearby jungles of East Malaysia, and the Chinese . supported their cause. But systematic political guidance and encouragement did not begin until the start of Mao's Cultural Revolution, The new, systematic stage of Chinese guidance and encouragement began on 9 July 1966. On that day,ra ‘ North Kalimantan client of the Chinese -- ostensibly a "delegate" to the Emergency Meeting of. the Chinese- controlled Afro-Asian Writers Association held in Peking -- put forth a program for the guerrilla war in East Malaysia. The North Kalimantan puppet called for the guerrillas to (1) “take up arms" in order to attain "national tiberattion," -~128- (2) "fully mobilize the masses of peasants" of vartous "natton- alities" (rather than almost ex- elusively vallying local Chinese), - (3) "unite" all the "elassea and nationalities" that can be untted, (4) "expose" the "veacttonary" nature . of the “"vuling elique,". \° (5) "wage the people's var," and (6) "persist in self-reliance." This Peking initiative was given additional force with- in one month, Another North Kalimantan client of the Chinese was used by them to make a declaration from Shanghai on 9 August 1966, ' We must wage a people's war in acecord~ anee wtth Mao Tse-tung's strategy and tacttes for guerrilla-war, In parti- cular, we must do mass work and rely . on. tocal armed units and militia. The Chinese used these two men to fire the opening shot in order to revive the small insurgency, By means of such programmatic instructions, the Chinese helped move the insurgency into a new stage, stressing the serious matters of the need to work with the populace, of the need for increased discipline and political commitment , and of the need for military professionalism, -129- The North Kalimantan guerrillas began to in-- doctrinate their rank and file. Peking later stated that the North Kalimantan "People's Armed Forces" had “initiated a movement to study and apply, creatively, Chairman Mao's brilliant writings," especially those ‘which insisted that real revolutionaries can win against the worst odds. (NCNA article of 28 December 1968) The guerrillas "study Mao Tsetung ~ thought in the course of their war, use it to review and sum up the practice of théir struggle, and raise their under- standing steadily." (NCNA. article of 2 November. 1969) Thus despite the small size of the insurgency, the Chinese were determined to help the guerrillas: disci- pline their ranks and deepen their political commit- ment so that the movement would not sputter and die. Most of the weapons held by men in the field in this North Borneo mini-insurgency have been stolen, and there is no evidence of outside sources of arms, ammuni > oY other supplies. Their groups still are not big enough to combine into a guerrilla army which. could mount a sustained insurgency, However, from 1971 to the spring of 1972 their numbers have increased from 500 to about 1,000. . Peking broadcasts Since 1969 have been’ stressing. the need to gain sup- port of minority nationalities. The SCO has made some progress in recruiting among the Ibans -- a non-Malay tribal group which, together with local Chinese, pro- vides areas of “sanctuary for the terrorists when’ ‘hounded: by Malaysian government security forces. They do not seem to have a disciplined political organization. They do not have an intensive military trdining program or permanent base areas, as do the CTs in West Malaysia. However, they are troublesome enough to have impelled Malaysian authorities to launch counterinsurgency opera- tions against them, draining off some security fortes. — from West Malaysia. In recent years, both the VMR and: Radio Peking” have referred more’ and more’ to the North Kalimantan - People's Armed Forces and have virtually. dropped fefer- ences to the front of the Sarawak.Communists since 1969, As in the case of Burma, Thailand, and West Malaysia, great stress has been placed on building up contacts with "all" nationalities (rather than keeping the insurgency exclusively ethnic Chinese). But since. ‘permanent “base areas" apparently do not exist in Sarawak yet, such areas are not mentioned in broadcasts, although “mass work” reportedly has opened up some safe- havens among the "various nationalities." An NCNA _article of 23 February 1972, which claimed that the People's Armed Forces have existed since 1965, discussed ‘SCO areas ‘of operations without. claiming the establish- ment of "base areas" -- presumably a future target for the SCO, For the present, friendly zones were adequate. In the course of protracted revo- . tuttonary atruggle, the People’s Armed Forees have done masa work apart from fighting. Thus they have established ‘elose relations with the masses of people of various nationalities ltke those of ftsh to water. ‘The commanders and eombatante of the People's Forces. frequently go to the areas of various. : nattonaltttes to live and Labor together with the toecal people. They give mediaal treatment to the sick, concern themselves with the well-being of the masses, and propagate revoluttonary truth among them, Not a few of the: people have. rerderéd | eupport and protectton to the People's Armed Forees, dteregarding thetr own safety and even sacrificing their own. Lives.’ Whenever the reacttonary troops ~131- and potiece eame to launch "enetrelement and suppression" operations, the peopte passed on'information to the People's Forees and rendered them all .kinde of © aupport so that they could know the enemy's movements and, using flextble, tacttes, attack the enemy. - The article claims that the insurgents are improving | their military and political training, studying "people's war": doctrine -- Mao's, by implication ~- in order to "enhance their combat capability."' As for the goals of the "protracted" war, the.article maintains: Peking's' ambiguity, saying only that the “revolution" in North Kalimantan should succeed but making no mention as to who is to be overthrown and. whether it is HBS EDEESCHCE that is to be attained. The insurgents in Sarawak and farther south in . the western portion of Borneo (Kalimantan) apparently are still avoiding use of the phrase, "Communist Party," to depict their organization. The ambiguity of whether they are a separate "Communist Party" in a separate country or part of the larger MCP is being sustained. The insurgents may have banded together in a new f organization to improve their internal control structure, part of Bored have integrated themselves into a new organization: The Organization for the. Defense of the People and Fatherland. The title is ambiguous about : which country is the "fatherland," . It_also avoids: the .' idea of "liberation" of the country. See ia the rganization ; TEE WaNe-pROUE apeTatInG = alte cities of Indonesia, and [____]Jcommunications with the groups in the western part -132- of Borneo (Kalimantan) is conducted by radio. sear transmissions originate in Djakarta,. and aré sén out following news broadcasts of Radio Peking. Each group has a radio receiver which:is operated by: a member trained =) for this purpose. Transmissions include reports on™ President Suharto, and.on Foreign Minister A. Malik's riches. .These are intended as psy chological warfare material to undermine confidence in government officials. The Peking-run VMR continues to broadcast.on developments’ in the insurgency in east Malaysia, and it is likely that these broadcasts as:well as those of Radio Peking are monitored and utilized by the guerrillas. at ms t As in other cases of Peking's support for in~ surgency in Southéast Asia, there is today a clash between insurgency~support and diplomatic- advance in: .PRC policy. On the one hand, Peking's propaganda implies that liberation or independence from the ? Malaysian Federation is a demand of Sarawak Communists, - that that is what they are fighting for, and that that is what the Chinese leaders. are supporting. On the other hand, for diplomacy purposes, Chou En-lai in May 1971 made reference to "Malaysia." This implied that Peking accepts the permanency and territorial integrity - of the Federation as one state formed in 1963, This two-level policy of ‘both insurgency support and diplo- macy shows no Signs of ERaIABS: